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COMMENT
PUTTING A HOLD ON ICE: WHY LAW
ENFORCEMENT SHOULD REFUSE TO
HONOR IMMIGRATION DETAINERS
ALIA AL-KHATIB
Beginning in the 1980s, immigration law began to place greater emphasis
on noncitizens’ past criminal convictions as grounds for deportation. This
shift led to the deportation of many noncitizens with strong ties to the United
States. In its effort to deport noncitizens with criminal convictions, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed various programs
through which local law enforcement can partner with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
The immigration detainer, also known as an ICE hold, is one tool used by
ICE to facilitate the deportation of noncitizens with criminal convictions.
Immigration detainers are requests made by ICE to local law enforcement
agencies to maintain custody of noncitizens, who are already detained for state
or local charges, for a forty-eight hour period beyond that required in their
criminal case. The practice of enforcing immigration detainers has led to the
mistaken detention of U.S. citizens and the prolonged detention of noncitizens,
including those with minor, nonviolent criminal convictions.
By issuing detainers without sufficient probable cause, ICE violates the
Fourth Amendment rights of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens held under
immigration detainers. Local law enforcement agencies violate the Fourth
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Amendment rights of individuals subject to immigration detainers when they
enforce these detainers without probable cause. Local law enforcement agencies
also violate due process rights of noncitizens when they prolong their detention
under immigration detainers beyond the permitted forty-eight hour period.
Additionally, enforcing immigration detainers presents serious policy
concerns.
First, it diminishes immigrant communities’ trust in law
enforcement, a consequence that threatens public safety. Second, it may trigger
local law enforcement officers’ implicit racial biases such that they may target
individuals for minor criminal offenses based solely on the belief that they may
be deportable noncitizens. Third, enforcing detainers places an enormous
financial cost on state and local law enforcement because the federal government
does not pay for their enforcement according to the relevant regulation.
Because of the potential constitutional violations and these significant
policy considerations, local law enforcement agencies should refuse to enforce
immigration detainers. Some jurisdictions, such as the State of California
and the city of New Orleans, Louisiana, have already limited the enforcement
of immigration detainers. Other jurisdictions should adopt similar laws to
protect the constitutional rights of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2009, Mario Cacho, a construction worker living in New
Orleans, Louisiana, completed his sentence for disturbing the peace
in the Orleans Parish Prison.1 Instead of being released upon
completing his sentence, Mr. Cacho remained incarcerated under an
immigration detainer after U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) asked the local prison to hold Mr. Cacho in its
custody for forty-eight hours until ICE could determine whether to
place him in deportation proceedings.2 ICE chose not to retain
custody of Mr. Cacho after the forty-eight hour period; however, the
Orleans Parish Prison continued to hold him even though the
permitted period under the detainer had expired.3 Finally, the
Orleans Parish Prison released Mr. Cacho into ICE custody but only
after he took legal action and had spent a total of 164 days in the
prison.4 For those 164 days, Orleans Parish law enforcement deprived

1. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Preliminary Statement at 1, 6, Cacho v. Gusman,
No. 2:11-cv-00225 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Original Complaint].
2. Id. at 6–7; see ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm (last
visited Sept. 23, 2014) (defining an immigration detainer and the scope of ICE’s
authority to issue one, including that “[i]f ICE does not assume custody after 48 hours . . .
, the local law enforcement authority (LEA) is required to release the individual”).
3. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
4. See Campbell Robertson, New Orleans and U.S. in Standoff on Detentions, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/new-orleans-andus-in-standoff-on-detentions.html (detailing Mr. Cacho’s saga from his initial
incarceration to his ultimate deportation to Honduras). Subsequently, the Orleans
Parish Sheriff’s Office adopted a policy that limits enforcement of immigration
detainers to a few circumstances. See Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Procedures, ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/
immigrantjustice.org/files/New%20Orleans%20Detainer%20Policy.pdf
(last
updated June 21, 2013) (permitting enforcement of immigration detainers only
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Mr. Cacho of his liberty and subjected him to the abhorrent
conditions at the prison.5 Mr. Cacho’s experience illustrates the
potential harms, including severe Fourth Amendment and due
process violations that can result from the enforcement of
immigration detainers, a tool that ICE has relied heavily on in its
attempts to prioritize the deportation of noncitizens who have been
captured by the criminal justice system.6
Recognizing that it cannot deport all of the estimated 11.5 million
unauthorized individuals who reside in the United States,7 the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has prioritized removing
noncitizens who have criminal convictions or who pose national
security threats.8 In June 2011, John Morton, then-Director of ICE,
articulated the federal government’s civil immigration priorities in a
memorandum regarding prosecutorial discretion in immigration
enforcement.9 These guidelines provided that ICE agents and
attorneys can and should exercise discretion based on a variety of
factors at any point in the immigration enforcement process and
emphasized exercising discretion as early in the process as possible to

when the individual subject to the detainer has been charged with specific crimes,
such as murder or armed robbery).
5. See Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff 5 (Sept.
11,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
parish_findlet.pdf (finding that Orleans Parish Prison failed to protect inmates from
“harm and serious risk of harm from staff and other inmates” and that it also
“fail[ed] to provide safe and sanitary environmental conditions”).
6. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief
Counsel 2 (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionreform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf [hereinafter December 2012 Morton Memo]
(stating that enforcement of detainers should be consistent with ICE policies, which
prioritize deporting noncitizens who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses).
7. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF
THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY
2011 1 (2012), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf (defining unauthorized immigrants as foreign-born noncitizens
who are not legal U.S. residents).
8. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All ICE Emps., 1–2 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [hereinafter March 2011
Morton Memo]; see also Cecilia Muñoz, Immigration Update: Maximizing Public Safety
and Better Focusing Resources, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-publicsafety-and-better-focusing-resources (emphasizing the Obama Administration’s strategy to
invest resources in deporting individuals who threaten public safety or national security).
9. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief
Counsel 1–2 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
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save government resources.10 Even though removal proceedings are
civil,11 not criminal, matters, ICE “focus[es] first on those who have
been charged with or convicted of the most dangerous crimes.”12
These statements suggest that civil detention and removal of
noncitizens as a result of a criminal offense targets only high-level
offenders and those that clearly threaten public safety.13
In fiscal year 2013, ICE reported that ninety-eight percent of its
removals met one of the agency’s civil immigration removal
priorities.14 ICE also reported that fifty-nine percent of the 368,644
individuals it removed from the United States in fiscal year 2013 had
previously been convicted of a crime.15 Although ICE purports to
remove dangerous criminals, from 2009 to 2011, it most often removed
individuals for drug offenses and ordinary traffic violations.16 Thus,
the immigration enforcement system captures low-level offenders,
many of whom have substantial familial ties to the United States.17
10. Id. at 3–5.
11. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A
MODERNIZED APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING AND REMOVING CRIMINAL ALIENS 2010, available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf.
13. March 2011 Morton Memo, supra note 8, at 1–2. Level 1 offenders are
defined as those “aliens convicted of crimes, with a particular emphasis on violent
criminals, felons, and repeat offenders” and include those individuals who “otherwise
pose a serious risk to public safety.” Id. at 2.
14. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY 2013 ICE IMMIGRATION
REMOVALS 1–2 (2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-iceimmigration-removals.pdf [hereinafter FY 2013 ICE REMOVALS] (defining a “criminal
offender” as an individual who has been convicted of one or more criminal offenses
in the United States). While the definition of “criminal offender” excludes
individuals who have committed civil traffic offenses, it includes individuals convicted
of all levels of criminal offenses. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 1.
16. IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, A DECADE OF RISING
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 4 (2013), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/docs/enforcementstatsfactsheet.pdf. Immigration offenses were
one of the three types of criminal convictions for which noncitizens were most
frequently removed from the United States. Id. Immigration offenses can be also
prosecuted as civil offenses, so categorizing them as criminal convictions is
“somewhat misleading.” Id.
17. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS): NONCITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 2 (2009), http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/us0409web.pdf (finding that between 1997 and 2007,
seventy-two percent of the individuals deported from the United States were
removed on account of committing nonviolent offenses); see also APPLIED RESEARCH
CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES:
THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 11 (2011), available at http://www.
atlanticphilanthropies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/ARC_Report_Shattered_Fam
ilies_FULL_REPORT_Nov2011Release.pdf (calculating that twenty-two percent of
the individuals who were deported in 2011 had U.S.-citizen children); New York
Immigrant Family Unity Project, VERA INST. JUST., http://www.vera.org/project/newyork-immigrant-family-unity-project (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (noting that over 7,000 U.S.citizen children in New York City lost a parent to deportation between 2005 and 2010).
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The reality is not only troubling to advocates but also undermines
the government’s decision to base eligibility for deportation on
criminal conduct.18
Concerns about public safety also serve as the basis for the
detention of noncitizens.19 Many problems plague the immigration
detention system, and critics have decried the detention of low-level
offenders,20 the conditions of immigration detention,21 the mandate
to detain a certain number of noncitizens each day,22 and the
18. See Shirley P. Leyro, Exploring Deportation as a Causal Mechanism of Social
Disorganization, in OUTSIDE JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION AND THE CRIMINALIZING IMPACT
OF CHANGING POLICY AND PRACTICE 138 (David C. Brotherton et al. eds., 2013)
(stating that “the link between immigration and crime has been consistently
debunked by empirical studies”).
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) (mandating that the government retain custody
throughout removal proceedings of noncitizens who have committed certain
crimes); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003) (recognizing Congress’s concern
for the “increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens”); see also Anil Kalhan,
Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 45–46 (2010) (noting
that immigration judges are “precluded from independently reviewing” ICE’s decision to
detain a noncitizen in removal proceedings). Immigrant detentions in 2012 reached
478,000, an “all-time high.” JOHN. F. SIMANKSI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012 1 (2013), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012_0.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Steve Patrick Ercolani, Why Are Immigrants Being Deported for Minor
Crimes?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 20, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2013/11/why-are-immigrants-being-deported-for-minor-crimes/281622
(questioning the mandatory detention and deportation of certain nonviolent
offenders, including those classified as aggravated felons, and commenting on how
the U.S. Congress has “expanded the definition” of an aggravated felony, which
traditionally included violent crimes like murder, to include nonviolent crimes like
perjury and obstruction of justice). See generally Why Detain Nonviolent Immigrants?,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/opinion/laed-detainees-20130324 (urging legislators to consider alternatives to costly
immigration detention).
21. E.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF GA., PRISONERS OF PROFIT: IMMIGRANTS AND
DETENTION IN GEORGIA 15–19 (2012), available at http://www.acluga.org/download_
file/view_inline/42/244/%E2%80%8E (highlighting poor conditions in immigration
detention facilities in Georgia, including inadequate medical care, limited visitation
hours for friends and family, and deficient hygiene standards, among others). See
generally DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE, ONE YEAR LATER: THE ABSENCE OF
ACCOUNTABILITY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2–10 (2013), available at
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose
_and_close_one_year_later.pdf (expanding on reports of documented abuse and
inhumane conditions in ten immigrant detention facilities in the United States).
22. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2149 (“[F]unding made available under this heading shall
maintain a level not less 33,400 detention beds through September 30, 2010[.]”); see
also Release of Criminal Detainees by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Policy or
Politics?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6–7 (2013) (statement
of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (questioning the need to
place certain immigrants in detention after ICE released 2228 detainees due to
budgetary constraints, seventy-two percent of whom had no criminal history, and
twenty-one percent of whom had misdemeanor convictions); William Selway &
Margaret Newkirk, Congress’s Illegal-Immigration Detention Quota Costs $2 Billion a Year,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
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troubling parallels between civil immigration detention and criminal
punitive incarceration.23 In order to detain and remove noncitizens
based on their criminal convictions, immigration enforcement must
enlist the assistance of state and local law enforcement.24
Created by statute in 1986,25 immigration detainers, the tool ICE
used to prolong Mr. Cacho’s detention in the local jail, create a way
for ICE to funnel noncitizens directly into its custody after they have
been convicted of or arrested for any criminal offense by a local law
enforcement agency.26 By regulation, immigration detainers, also
known as ICE holds, are requests from ICE to local law enforcement
to maintain custody of an individual suspected of being deportable
for forty-eight hours after that individual would otherwise have been
released from the local police department’s custody.27 This period
provides time for ICE to arrange a transfer of custody from local law
enforcement to ICE.28 As discussed further in this Comment, this
extension of the noncitizens’ period of detention raises significant
constitutional concerns.
Similar to its policies surrounding immigration detention and
removal, ICE ostensibly prioritizes issuing detainers for dangerous
criminal offenders.29 The data available about immigration detainer
2013-09-26/congresss-illegal-immigration-detention-quota-costs-2-billion-a-year
(unpacking the costs of a daily quota for immigration detention).
23. E.g., Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the Need
for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 456 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he
immigration detention system largely follows a criminal incarceration model” and
that the government holds many immigrant detainees “in criminal jails or detention
facilities that resemble criminal jails”).
24. ICE consolidated its enforcement programs that partner with state and local
law enforcement in the Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance
Safety and Security (ACCESS) program. Fact Sheet: ICE Agreements of Cooperation in
Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/access.htm (last visited
Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: ICE ACCESS]. The programs include, among
several others, the Secure Communities program, which uses technology and
information sharing to help local communities identify and remove criminal
noncitizens, and the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), which works
with law enforcement to identify and disrupt criminal organizations that threaten
U.S. border security. Id.
25. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
26. See ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2 (stating that
detainers “are critical for ICE to be able to identify and ultimately remove criminal
aliens who are currently in federal, state, or local custody”); see also Christopher N.
Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 165 (2008) [hereinafter Lasch, Enforcing the Limits]
(noting that, without detainers, noncitizens charged with or convicted of certain
offenses would be released from custody).
27. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2014).
28. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2.
29. See December 2012 Morton Memo, supra note 6, at 2–3 (revising the immigration
detainer form and articulating ICE’s priorities for immigration detainer enforcement).
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enforcement illustrates, however, that ICE predominantly issues
detainers for low-level offenders and individuals with no criminal
history.30 For example, from October 1, 2011 to January 31, 2013,
approximately forty-eight percent of immigration detainers were
issued for individuals with no prior criminal conviction.31 Only
fourteen percent of individuals held under immigration detainers
were Level 1 offenders.32 Ordinary traffic offenses, driving under the
influence, and simple marijuana possession were the three most
frequent convictions for individuals with ICE detainers.33 Statespecific reports similarly found that ICE issued the majority of
detainers for low-level offenders.34
This Comment argues that immigration detainers as enforced
violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
30. Few ICE Detainers Target Serious Criminals, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330
[hereinafter TRAC, ICE Detainers]. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC) at Syracuse University gathers, researches, and distributes data concerning
the activities of the federal government; TRAC uncovers much of its information
about the government’s activities from the government’s responses to TRAC’s
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.
Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE http://trac.syr.edu/
aboutTRACgeneral.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
31. TRAC, ICE Detainers, supra note 30.
In addition to past criminal
convictions, ICE considers the charge for which the individual was initially
detained by local law enforcement; however, ICE failed to provide TRAC with any
data regarding pending charges. Id.
32. Id. The three classifications are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3. Level 1
offenders include aggravated felons and those who have been convicted of two or
more crimes punishable by more than one year. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED,
BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 10 tbl.1 (2012) [hereinafter
GAO, SECURE COMMUNITIES].
33. TRAC, ICE Detainers, supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT & HEATHER EVANS, IMMIGRATION DETAINER
REQUESTS IN KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 10 (2013),
available at https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Detainer
%20Cost--King%20County%20WA.pdf (finding that four out of the five people
detained under an immigration detainer did not have a felony conviction); RANDY
CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF
287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2011) available at
http://www.immigrationresearch-info.org/report/migration-policy-institute/delegationand-divergence-study-287g-state-and-local-immigration-e (finding that certain
counties in the State of Maryland issued eighty percent of their detainers against lowlevel and traffic offenders); ANDREA GUTTIN, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE
CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 9
fig.1 (2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal
_Alien_Program_021710.pdf (finding that fifty-eight percent of immigration
detainers in 2008 in Travis County, Texas were placed against individuals who had
been charged with misdemeanors); AARTI SHAHANI, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, NEW YORK
CITY ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NYC
%20Detainer%20Report.pdf (failing to find any correlation between eligibility for
deportation and the seriousness of the offense for which a detainer was issued).
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Constitution.35 ICE violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
when it issues and enforces an immigration detainer without
probable cause, and the local law enforcement agency (LEA) violates
an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when it enforces a detainer
that lacks probable cause. Following the initial issuance, when
noncitizens remain detained beyond the forty-eight hour period
without charges, the LEA continues to violate their Fourth
Amendment rights because it has not provided them with a probable
cause determination. The LEA violates noncitizens’ procedural due
process rights by failing to implement fair procedures to ensure their
timely release from custody.
Because of the potential for serious constitutional violations and
because immigration detainers are merely requests,36 state and local
LEAs should refuse to enforce these detainers. If state and local
LEAs choose not to enact such a blanket policy, then they should
refuse to enforce detainers against low-level offenders and
promulgate clear guidelines that provide safeguards against due
process violations.37 For individuals with pending criminal cases,
local jails should follow individualized determinations made by
judicial officers rather than enforce the immigration detainers.
Part I of this Comment examines the growing intersection of
criminal law and immigration law and how this convergence has led
to ICE’s increased reliance on state and local law enforcement and
the use of immigration detainers. It explains the statutory and
regulatory authority for immigration detainers and the constitutional
protections afforded to noncitizens, both upon the issuance of the
immigration detainer and after the forty-eight hour period has
elapsed. Part II analyzes the constitutional violations that result from
enforcing immigration detainers—specifically, violations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part III highlights additional
concerns that should motivate state and local legislatures to limit

35. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (holding that noncitizens
in deportation proceedings are entitled to due process); Yamataya v. Fisher (The
Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1902) (establishing that noncitizens have
a right to due process before deportation, regardless of their immigration status in
the United States). See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to noncitizens because by its
terms, it protects “person[s]” instead of only “citizen[s]”).
36. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2014).
37. An example of the latter can be found in a settlement agreement for a lawsuit
filed on behalf of individuals held under immigration detainers beyond the fortyeight hour period permitted by federal regulation. Settlement Agreement and
Stipulation of Dismissal Upon Termination of Agreement at 12, Brizuela v. Feliciano,
No. 3:12cv226 (JBA) (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2013).
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immigration detainer enforcement, namely immigrant communities’
distrust of law enforcement, implicit biases in police departments that
may lead to racial discrimination, and the cost of detainer
enforcement for state and local LEAs. Finally, this Comment
concludes that state and local jurisdictions have the power to and
should refuse to enforce immigration detainers.
I.

BACKGROUND

The growing convergence of immigration law and criminal law
over the past few decades has led the federal government to rely
increasingly on state and local law enforcement agencies to perform
certain immigration enforcement functions.38 The immigration
detainer is one important tool that the federal government uses to
facilitate the deportation of noncitizens caught by the criminal justice
system.39 Despite the intersection of criminal law and immigration
law, deportation proceedings and decisions related to the removal or
exclusion of noncitizens are civil, not criminal, matters.40 However,
because adjudicators frequently base deportation decisions on
criminal conduct, questions arise about what criminal procedural
protections, if any, should apply in deportation proceedings.41
A. The Criminalization of Immigration Law over the Past Three Decades
From the 1980s forward, the intersection of criminal and
immigration law has increased significantly.42 Because the U.S.
criminal justice system disproportionately impacts individuals based

38. See Fact Sheet: ICE ACCESS, supra note 24 (listing various programs through
which local law enforcement agencies can partner with ICE).
39. See sources cited supra note 26 (explaining that immigration detainers are
essential tools for ICE to use to identify and deport criminal noncitizens in law
enforcement custody).
40. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (recognizing that removal proceedings are
civil, not criminal, matters and thus “nonpunitive in purpose and effect”); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (explaining that deportation of a
noncitizen is not punishment for the commission of a crime but merely “a method of
enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied” with
certain conditions of his residence).
41. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of
the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 313
(2000) (stating that the deportation of a person based on a prior conviction, without
taking into account the person’s rehabilitation or whether the person provides a
benefit to family members residing in the United States, closely resembles
punishment for that prior offense).
42. See Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its
Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 118 (2012) (explaining that Congress
started criminalizing immigration law in the 1980s when it revised the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) “to more closely integrate criminal and immigration law”).
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on race and class,43 the use of criminal conduct as a proxy for
immigrant desirability44 leads to troubling results, such as the
deportation of individuals with strong ties to the United States.45
1.

Changes to criminal and immigration law in the 1980s
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began to pass legislation that
increased noncitizens’ risk of deportation as a result of criminal
conduct.46 In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA),47 which imposes sanctions upon employers who
knowingly employ undocumented immigrants.48 A short provision in
the IRCA provides that for noncitizens with criminal convictions,
deportation proceedings “shall” begin “as expeditiously as possible
after the date of the conviction.”49 In 1986, Congress also passed the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA).50
The ADAA changed the
inadmissibility provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)51 so that any conviction related to any controlled substance in
43. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (providing several scholars’
criticism of the criminal justice system as one that takes advantage of and further
isolates marginalized groups).
44. Cf. Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 14 (1996)
[hereinafter Hearing: Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens] (statement of David A.
Martin, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (stating that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) promptly implemented certain
measures included in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to
ensure “maximum removals of criminal aliens”).
45. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 372 (2006) (observing that the convergence of criminal
law and immigration has negatively impacted lawful permanent residents and other
long-term resident noncitizens, groups that were previously protected from
deportation as a result of legal and cultural barriers); see also Angela M. Banks, The
Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1247
(2013) (arguing that to curtail the harsh consequences of criminal deportations,
noncitizens’ right to remain should be based on more than citizenship, such as
length of residence and family connections).
46. See Ryan D. King et al., Employment and Exile: U.S. Criminal Deportations, 1908–
2005, 117 AM. J. OF SOC. 1786, 1797 (2012) (indicating that the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 was a major turning point as
related to criminal deportations).
47. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
48. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. 3360. IRCA added sections 274A, 274B, and 274C to
the Immigration and Nationality Act and prohibits employers from hiring
undocumented immigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2012).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1). The enactment of this legislation also catalyzed the
use of jails and prisons as facilities to house noncitizens subject to removal
proceedings. See Immigration Reform and Control Act § 702 (requiring the
Department of Defense to provide the Attorney General with a list of facilities that
could be used to detain noncitizens within sixty days of the date of IRCA’s enactment).
50. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
51. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). Prior to 1996, the inadmissibility
grounds were considered “exclusion” grounds. After Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
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the United States, a state, or a foreign country would make a
noncitizen inadmissible.52 Notably, the ADAA also created immigration
detainers, but they are meant to be issued only against noncitizens
convicted of controlled substance offenses.53 The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 198854 then created the category of an aggravated felony, a
classification unique to immigration law that makes a noncitizen
deportable based on certain categories of criminal conduct.55 The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act also mandated that aggravated felons be
detained upon completion of their criminal sentence while their
deportation proceedings are pending.56
The criminalization of immigration law ran parallel to, and in
some ways depended on, a significant shift in the criminal
punishment model. Beginning in the late 1980s, the model for
criminal conduct was characterized as a more punitive one that
emphasized confinement and incapacitation.57 Support for this
position emerged by painting issues of crime as “race-neutral.”58

208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), however, noncitizens who were previously considered
excludable for not meeting certain criteria upon entry were then deemed to be
inadmissible. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 420–21 (5th ed. 2009). Thus, a noncitizen could be
physically present in the United States but never have been admitted. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission” as “lawful entry . . . after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer”). Individuals who are inadmissible may be
subject to deportation on both inadmissibility and deportability grounds. See LEGOMSKY &
RODRÍGUEZ, supra at 420–21 (distinguishing between inadmissibility and deportability).
52. Under the deportability provisions, a noncitizen is deportable if, after
admission, the noncitizen has been convicted of violating, attempting to violate, or
conspiring to violate “any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign
country relating to a controlled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The statute
contains an exception for a single offense for possession of thirty grams or less of
marijuana for personal use. Id. Any noncitizen who is, or any time after admission
was, a drug abuser or addict is also deportable. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).
53. Id. § 1357(d).
54. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
55. Id. §§ 7341–43. The original aggravated felony definition included only
murder, drug trafficking offenses, and illicit trafficking of firearms. Id. § 7342.
56. Id. § 7343.
57. See King, supra note 46, at 1796–98 (explaining that the period from 1987–
2005 represented a “categorical shift in crime control more generally, one that
severely curtailed administrative and judicial discretion and reemphasized punitive
sanctions,” and adding that the new punitive model was also characterized by a
“dramatic curtailment of judicial discretion”); McLeod, supra note 42, at 130
(criticizing the convergence of criminal and immigration law because it allowed
problematic aspects of the criminal punishment model, such as reliance on incarceration
and excessive punishment, to be incorporated into an immigration regulatory setting).
58. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 48 (2012) (arguing that former President Ronald Reagan
mastered this sort of “color-blind rhetoric” related to welfare and crime and that
such rhetoric exploited racial hostility and resentment).
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Notably, the “tough on crime” stance extended across party lines.59
Scholars and advocates have argued that this shift in the 1980s
cultivated a criminal justice system that primarily targets people of
color and greatly disadvantages those who lack the resources to afford
legal representation.60
As support for incarceration as punishment grew during this
period, the number of deportations of noncitizens labeled as
criminals also grew.61 The race-neutral rhetoric created during the
1980s bolstered the use of criminal convictions as grounds for
deporting immigrants.62 Although some may believe that criminal
convictions are an appropriate proxy for whether noncitizens should
be allowed to remain in the United States,63 basing deportability on
criminal conduct subjects any noncitizen with a criminal conviction,
including those with strong ties to the United States, to possible
deportation.64 For many individuals, a criminal conviction results in a

59. See King, supra note 46, at 1800 (explaining that deportation as a form of
punishment has increased and is not necessarily linked to political conservatism).
60. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 58, at 180 (“[The criminal justice system] is a
set of structural arrangements that locks a racially distinct group into a subordinate
political, social, and economic position . . . .”); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1999) (arguing that the policy
of mass incarceration in the criminal justice system actually depends on race and
class disparities of defendants in the system); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh,
Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance after Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150,
2171 (2012) (“In [the criminal justice] system, poverty, not justice, dictates outcomes.”).
61. SIMANKSI & SAPP, supra note 19, at 1 (reporting that “an all-time high” of
199,000 criminal noncitizens were removed from the U.S. in 2012); see also MARY
DOUGHERTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2004 1 (2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf (stating that 88,897 criminal
noncitizens were removed from the U.S. in 2004 and seventy-seven percent of
them were from Mexico).
62. Some scholars have condemned the use of criminal conduct as a basis for
deportation and have alleged it perpetuates racial injustice. See, e.g., Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into
the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1117 (1998) (providing an historical account
of ways that racism has infected immigration law); Yolanda Vázquez, Perpetuating the
Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration
Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 665–66 (2011) (arguing that the
convergence of criminal and immigration law serves to further exclude, discriminate,
and marginalize Latinos in the United States).
63. See Is Secure Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 6 (2011) [hereafter Hearing: Is Secure Communities Keeping Our Communities
Secure?] (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary)
(“Who wouldn’t want to deport a criminal immigrant?”); 141 CONG. REC. 15,039
(1995) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) (arguing that noncitizens with criminal
convictions must be deported as rapidly as possible or they will “prey on more
American citizens”).
64. See McLeod, supra note 42, at 130–51 (detailing how the criminalimmigration convergence negatively impacts U.S. citizens, lawful permanent

AL-KHATIB.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

122

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/2014 2:44 PM

[Vol. 64:109

myriad of negative consequences,65 but for noncitizens, a criminal
conviction may also result in permanent separation from their
families, homes, and jobs.66 Unlike criminal defendants, however,
noncitizens in removal proceedings do not have a right to counsel.67
As a result, more than half of noncitizens are not represented in
deportation proceedings.68 Further, criminal convictions make many
forms of removal relief impossible, even for those with strong ties in
the United States.69 The severe consequences of criminal convictions
for noncitizens create doubt about whether the system truly serves
civil, rather than punitive, objectives.70
2.

Immigration law and enforcement in the 1990s and beyond
Beginning in 1990, it became more difficult for immigrants to seek
relief because the preceding Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated
most forms of discretionary relief from deportation.71 The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
residents, and other groups of immigrants as well as how the system expends
unnecessary resources).
65. See ALEXANDER, supra note 58, at 141–58 (discussing common consequences
of criminal convictions, such as the inability to obtain housing, difficulty finding
employment, and hefty debts from court fees).
66. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (recognizing that
deportation is a “particularly severe penalty” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966)
(requiring “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” to prove the grounds of
deportation in removal proceedings because of the “drastic deprivations” that result
from deportation); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 12–16 (arguing
that the state’s power to deport should be limited when it infringes upon certain
human rights, like the “fundamental right to live together with close family
members, including minor children”).
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (stating that noncitizens may be
represented by counsel at their own expense in removal proceedings).
68. See, e.g., Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 169, 172 (2010) (noting that seventy percent of individuals
in removal proceedings in Tacoma and Seattle, Washington immigration courts were
unrepresented in 2008); The Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation
Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal
Proceedings: New York Immigrant Representation Study Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
357, 363 (2011) (reporting that in New York City, sixty percent of detained
immigrants and twenty-seven percent of non-detained immigrants were
unrepresented when their cases were completed).
69. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (making individuals with aggravated
felony convictions ineligible for asylum); id. § 1229b(a)(3) (stating that lawful
permanent residents are ineligible for cancellation of removal—a form of
deportation relief—if they have an aggravated felony conviction).
70. See Pauw, supra note 41, at 333–34 (arguing that the current application of
criminal grounds of exclusion illustrates Congress’s punitive intent in immigration
laws because remedial purposes do not justify the sanctions).
71. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, also had
implications for deportations based on criminal conduct. See supra note 52
(explaining that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) made attempted as well as completed
criminal acts involving controlled substances deportable offenses).
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199672 made significant changes to the INA and immigration
enforcement and further increased the use of past criminal conduct
In an effort to capture more
as grounds for deportation.73
noncitizens who interacted with the criminal justice system in a
variety of capacities, IIRIRA greatly broadened the definition of
criminal conviction.74 Commenting on the severity of the criminal
deportation provisions of IIRIRA, the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
“Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable
offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, his
removal is practically inevitable.”75 IIRIRA also created the 287(g)
provision of the INA, which allows local law enforcement agencies to
perform specific immigration enforcement functions.76
Along with IIRIRA, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA)77 expanded the list of crimes for which a noncitizen
could be deported.78 It expanded the definition of aggravated
felonies to include various nonviolent offenses, such as forgery and
counterfeiting.79 Although criminal conduct has been a basis for
deportation for nearly a century,80 these legislative changes vastly
expanded its use for that purpose. Immigration law now allows for
the expulsion of classes of individuals based on categories of criminal
activity.81 These changes also made it significantly easier to deport
noncitizens with criminal histories, even lawful permanent residents.82
72. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
73. IIRIRA also established new inadmissibility and deportability provisions. See
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 51, at 420–21 (distinguishing between
inadmissibility and deportability).
74. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-879, at 123 (1997) (“[IIRIRA] broadens the definition
of ‘conviction’ for immigration law purposes to include all aliens who have admitted
to or been found to have committed crimes. This will make it easier to remove
criminal aliens, regardless of specific procedures in States for deferred adjudication
or suspension of sentences.”).
75. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
76. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the implementation of 287(g) agreements and
problems arising from that initiative).
77. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
78. AEDPA modified the INA’s deportability provision related to crimes
involving moral turpitude to include crimes for which a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). AEDPA also allowed
state and local law enforcement to detain individuals who are unlawfully present in
the United States, were previously convicted of felonies, and were deported from or
left the United States after their felony convictions. Id. § 1252c.
79. Id. § 1101(a)(43). For these offenses to trigger an aggravated felony
designation, they must carry a potential one-year term of imprisonment. Id. AEDPA
also created a presumption of deportability for aggravated felons. Id. § 1228(c).
80. King et al., supra note 46, at 1795 (noting that legislation in 1917 was the first
of its kind in the United States to call for the deportation of noncitizens who
received jail sentences for multiple crimes involving moral turpitude).
81. See Hearing: Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens, supra note 44, at 15
(statement of David A. Martin, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization
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After September 11, 2001, immigration enforcement methods shifted
significantly.83 In 2002, the Homeland Security Act84 established the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave DHS a primary
mission to protect against terrorist threats.85 Congress placed ICE
within DHS with the stated mission “to promote homeland security
and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of
federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and
immigration.”86 Because many deportation grounds depended on
criminal conduct by this time, ICE’s programs enlist state and local
LEAs, which directly interact with individuals who have committed
criminal offenses.87
B. Enlisting Local Law Enforcement and the Function of the
Immigration Detainer
The federal government could not use criminal convictions as a
proxy for deportation eligibility without enlisting state and local
LEAs.88 Although state and local legislatures have created their own
Service) (explaining that, under AEDPA, individuals are deportable for a crime
involving moral turpitude even if they were not sentenced to any jail time and even if
they have been lawful permanent residents for many years).
82. See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-644A, DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL
ALIENS AFTER P.L. 104-132, THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT:
EXPANDED DETENTION AND RESTRICTION “212(C)” RELIEF 1 (1996) (stating that the
AEDPA eliminated the existing exceptions for lawful permanent residents regarding
mandatory detention and instead applied these provisions to all noncitizens
convicted of certain crimes); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 2
(finding that twenty-two percent of noncitizens who were deported from the United
States between 1997 and 2007 were lawfully in the country); Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Latinas and Their Families in Detention: The Growing Intersection of
Immigration Law and Criminal Law, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 225, 229–30 (2008)
(indicating that members of the Latino community are fearful of the increased rise
of deportations after federal law enforcement “rounded up” members of their
community and deported them because of their criminal histories).
83. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restriction, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830–31 (2007) (noting that certain
immigration administration functions were identified as important national security
priorities after 9/11).
84. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
85. Id. § 101(b)(1).
86. Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
about/overview (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT].
87. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that the ICE ACCESS
program enables local law enforcement agencies to partner with ICE in multiple ways
and providing examples of several partnership programs).
88. See Proposals to Reduce Illegal Immigration and Control Costs to Taxpayers: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 19 (1995) (statement of Janet Reno,
Att’y Gen. of the United States) (identifying “aggressively pursuing criminal aliens”
as the second of four prongs in the federal government’s then-strategy to fight illegal
immigration). See generally Empowering Local Law Enforcement to Combat Illegal
Immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
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laws regarding restrictions on different classes of immigrants,89 DHS
has created two programs that specifically target noncitizens who are
or have been involved with the criminal justice system: 287(g) and
Secure Communities. Both of these programs utilize immigration
detainers, and both have been the source of great controversy.
1.

287(g)
The 287(g) program, which permits voluntary agreements between
local law enforcement and ICE, is one way that the federal
government has allowed local law enforcement to opt in to assisting
with immigration enforcement.90 The program provides three
possible models for LEAs to partner with federal immigration agents:
(1) the “jail model,” which allows correctional officers in state prisons
or local jails to access federal immigration databases to screen those
arrested or convicted of crimes; (2) the “task force model,” which
allows law enforcement officers in criminal task forces to screen
arrested individuals by accessing federal immigration databases; and
(3) the “joint model,” which allows agencies to implement the jail
and task force models at the same time.91
Through 287(g)
agreements, ICE trains local officers to perform certain immigration
enforcement functions, and under the jail model and joint model,
these officers may issue immigration detainers.92 Data from 2010
shows that, in a ten-month period, the jail model accounted for
ninety percent of the detainers issued by local law enforcement
officers trained under the 287(g) program.93

Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 1–2 (2006) (statement of Rep. Mark
E. Souder, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, & Human Res.)
(characterizing noncitizens with criminal convictions as a “problem” compared to
other noncitizens who “would prefer to quietly find work and earn money” and
documenting ICE’s efforts to partner with state and local police agencies to deport
noncitizens with criminal convictions). Although ICE has over 20,000 employees, see
Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 86, an estimated 11.5
million unauthorized noncitizens live in the United States, see supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-10 § 5 (2006) (imposing civil
sanctions on property owners who rent or lease to undocumented immigrants).
90. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/287g (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Section 287(g) Delegation of Authority, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT].
91. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED
OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
LAWS 8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/285583.pdf [hereinafter
GAO, BETTER CONTROLS].
92. Section 287(g) Delegation of Authority, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 90.
93. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
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At “its peak,” around sixty local agencies had 287(g) agreements
with ICE,94 but that number has since decreased by nearly half.95 The
program has been heavily criticized for its lack of oversight and
accountability.96 In a number of jurisdictions that have 287(g)
agreements, local law enforcement officers take advantage of their
power as immigration agents to target low-level offenders and
noncitizens who they view as undesirable.97 In some areas, deputizing
local law enforcement as immigration agents only led to a
disproportionate increase in arrests of Latinos, particularly for lowlevel offenses.98 For example, the U.S. Department of Justice sued
Maricopa County, Arizona and its sheriff, Joseph Arpaio, asserting
that the county had abused 287(g) to target Latinos in the
community and had violated Latino individuals’ civil rights.99 As a
94. See Alan Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Shut Down, USA TODAY
(Feb. 17, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/201202-17/immigration-enforcement-program/53134284/1 (adding that only eight
additional agencies have signed up for the program during the Obama Administration).
95. As of October 5, 2014, thirty-five law enforcement agencies have current
287(g) agreements. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
96. GAO, BETTER CONTROLS, supra note 91, at 13 (finding that 287(g) agreements
in certain jurisdictions failed to specify under what circumstances an individual can be
interrogated regarding her immigration status and that only individuals with a
conviction for a state or federal felony offense should be processed for possible removal).
97. See Elliot Ozment, 287(g) and Secured Communities: Some of the Dangers of
Delegating Federal Powers, 9 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 120, 124–25 (2013) (explaining that the
Nashville Sheriff’s Department implemented its 287(g) program to target any
potentially deportable noncitizen, even those who had committed low-level
nonviolent offenses like driving without a driver’s license); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF TENN., CONSEQUENCES & COSTS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE’S JAIL MODEL 287(G) PROGRAM 6 (2012) (“[T]he top five charges
immigrants faced as a gateway to deportation under Davidson County, Tennessee’s
287(g) program continued to be traffic violations or minor crimes.”). In 2008 in
North Carolina, 3,000 noncitizens were placed in removal proceedings because of
the 287(g) agreement; twenty-three percent of them were charged with driving while
intoxicated, and thirty-three percent were charged with other motor vehicle
violations. Vázquez, supra note 62, at 662.
98. See TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KHOLI, UNIV. OF CAL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN INSTITUTE ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL
PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (finding that in
Irving, Texas, twenty-four hour access to ICE via phone and video immediately
increased the rate of discretionary arrests of Latinos, particularly for traffic offenses).
99. Complaint at 5, United States v. Maricopa Cnty., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D.
Ariz. 2012) (No. 12-cv-00981-LOA). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
also sued the infamous Sheriff Joseph Arpaio alleging that, under the sheriff’s watch,
law enforcement targeted and detained people because of their race. Melendres v.
Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2009); see also William Finnegan, Sheriff
Joe, THE NEW YORKER (July 20, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2009/07/20/090720fa_fact_finnegan?currentPage=3 (providing an exposé on
Sheriff Arpaio’s tenure in Maricopa County). In a detailed opinion, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona held that the Maricopa County’s law enforcement
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result, in 2012, DHS revoked 287(g) agreements with seven counties in
Arizona.100 The Obama Administration has decided to phase out 287(g)
agreements in favor of using the Secure Communities program.101
2.

Secure Communities
Announced in 2008, the Secure Communities program permits
local LEAs and ICE to indirectly share information about criminal
detainees in state or local custody.102 Like other programs, DHS
created Secure Communities to target high-level criminal
offenders.103 Under the program, local law enforcement first
provides criminal detainees’ fingerprint information to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a step already in place in the booking
process for criminal suspects.104
Next, the FBI releases the
information to ICE with or without the agreement of local law
enforcement.105 When ICE first introduced Secure Communities,
state and local jurisdictions believed that it was a voluntary program,
and as a result, various jurisdictions refused to participate.106 ICE
policy of detaining individuals believed to be unlawfully present in the United States
and then waiting for ICE to inform law enforcement how to proceed with the
individuals resulted in unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Melendres, v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827–28 (D. Ariz.), adhered to by No. CV–0702513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013).
100. See Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, ARIZ.
CAPITOL TIMES (June 25, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/
25/homeland-security-revokes-287g-immigration-check-agreements-in-arizona
(adding that DHS also announced its agents would not respond to local law
enforcement requests to take custody of an undocumented noncitizen unless the
noncitizen met specific criteria under DHS’s immigration enforcement priorities).
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FY 2013 BUDGET IN BRIEF 16 (2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf
(seeking to reduce the 287(g) program’s budget by $17 million). Nonetheless, DHS
continues to provide funding for existing 287(g) programs. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2015 14 (2014), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15BIB.pdf (allocating $24 million to sustain
the 287(g) program at then-existing operating levels).
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012) (declaring that local government entities are not
prohibited or restricted from exchanging information about an individual’s immigration
status with federal immigration enforcement irrespective of existing state or local laws).
103. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR: 2014 23
(2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MGMT/
FY%202014%20BIB%20-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20%284%29.pdf
(stating that the purpose of Secure Communities is to focus resources on individuals
who pose a threat to public safety or national security).
104. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (explaining that
Secure Communities does not place a burden on local law enforcement because, for
decades, local jurisdictions have shared fingerprinting information of individuals who are
arrested or booked into custody with the FBI to determine if they have criminal records).
105. Id.
106. See Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06immigration.
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then announced that the program was mandatory and that
jurisdictions could not opt out of participating in it.107 In 2013,
concerns about Secure Communities intensified after ICE extended
the program to every jurisdiction in the United States.108
To understand how Secure Communities works, consider the story
of a Mexican noncitizen named Chel who lived in the United States
for eleven years and had two U.S.-citizen children.109 One day, a
police officer pulled over Chel, who was driving in his car with a
Latino passenger.110 When the officer asked him for identification,
Chel could produce only an expired driver’s license, so the officer
arrested Chel for driving with an expired license.111 During the
booking process, the FBI submitted Chel’s fingerprint information to
ICE via Secure Communities, and ICE issued a detainer; shortly
thereafter, ICE initiated removal proceedings against him.112
Much like the reality of deportation generally, Secure Communities
captures low-level offenders like Chel more frequently than its target,
dangerous offenders.113 Further, although recordkeeping is essential
html?_r=0 (identifying Illinois, Massachusetts, and California as three states that
considered not implementing or limiting the Secure Communities program).
107. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014);
see Paloma Esquivel, Federal Immigration Enforcement Is Mandatory, Memo Says, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/08/local/la-me-ice-foia20120109 (reporting on the controversy surrounding the federal government’s
change in position concerning the mandatory nature of Secure Communities).
108. See Gretchen Gavett, Controversial “Secure Communities” Immigration Program
Will Be Mandatory by 2013, PBS (Jan. 9, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/race-multicultural/lost-in-detention/controversial-secure-communitiesimmigration-program-will-be-mandatory-by-2013 (reporting on various local
government leaders’ negative reaction to an October 2010 memo that revealed the
Obama Administration’s plans to make Secure Communities mandatory in 2013);
Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/ice-to-expandsecure-communities-program-in-mass-and-ny.html (detailing how two Democratic
politicians decided to oppose President Obama on implementing the Secure
Communities program). The mandatory nature of the program confused and
frustrated immigrants’ rights advocates and law enforcement officials. Julia Preston
& Kirk Simple, Taking a Hard Line: Immigrants and Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18immigration.html?_r=0.
109. ALEX STEPICK ET AL., AMERICANS FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, FALSE PROMISES: THE
FAILURE OF SECURE COMMUNITIES IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 19–20 (2013), available at
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aijustice/legacy_url/147/False-Promises_-TheFailure-of-Secure-Communities-in-Miami-Dade-County.pdf?1376961031.
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Hearing: Is Secure Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure?, supra note
63, at 2–3 (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(explaining that, while the Secure Communities program was advertised as a
“voluntary, race-neutral, information sharing program,” DHS had decided to make
the program mandatory and suggesting that the program’s mandatory nature could

AL-KHATIB.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PUTTING A HOLD ON ICE

12/9/2014 2:44 PM

129

for determining an individual’s status under Secure Communities,
ICE has been criticized for its poor recordkeeping practices that may
lead to a greater number of incorrect matches and wrongful
detentions.114 Since the program became mandatory in all jurisdictions
in 2013, ICE has classified only a small percentage of individuals
identified through the program as Level 1 offenders,115 which has
resulted in the removal of over 2,000 Level 1 offenders.116 Although
some may view this number of removals as a success, the numbers do not
reflect the cost to the community and to government resources.117
3.

Immigration detainers
The immigration detainer is the practical tool necessary to directly
transfer noncitizens from the criminal justice system to detention in
ICE custody.118 This transfer can happen after an arrest or after the
individual has completed her criminal sentence for another crime.119
For example, Mario Cacho completed his sentence for disturbing the
peace in New Orleans, but he remained in custody at the Orleans
Parish Prison because of an immigration detainer.120
Immigration detainers are requests to state and local law
enforcement to maintain custody of individuals suspected of being

lead law enforcement officers to make pretextual arrests purely to check individuals’
immigration statuses); see also AARTI KOHLI ET AL., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE
NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS, UNIV. OF CAL., THE CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW & SOC. POLICY 3 (2011) (reporting that the
majority of noncitizens deported because of Secure Communities either did not have
a criminal history or were low-level offenders); STEPICK ET AL., supra note 109, at 2
(indicating that sixty-one percent of the individuals placed in removal proceedings in
Miami-Dade County, Florida were either low-level offenders or were found not guilty
for the crimes for which they were arrested and that only eighteen percent of these
individuals were considered high priority removals under ICE’s standards).
114. See GAO, SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 32, at 14 (reporting on large gaps
in ICE’s data related to noncitizens processed through Secure Communities); Anil
Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance,
and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1136 (2013) (stating that immigration authorities
have been criticized for maintaining unreliable and inaccurate records).
115. E.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES:
MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 4 (2013), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2013-to-date.pdf
[hereinafter ICE, SECURE COMMUNITIES: MONTHLY STATISTICS]. Level 1 offenders
include those convicted of any aggravated felony as defined under section
101(a)(43) of the INA or those convicted of two or more crimes punishable by more
than one year in prison. GAO, SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 32, at 10 tbl.1.
116. E.g., ICE, SECURE COMMUNITIES: MONTHLY STATISTICS, supra note 115, at 4.
117. See infra Part III.A.1 (assessing the community costs when police officers act
as immigration agents).
118. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2.
119. See id. (stating that one purpose of immigration detainers is to notify ICE of a
noncitizen’s impending release).
120. Supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (detailing Mario Cacho’s detention).
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deportable until ICE can take custody of those individuals and
Federal regulations define
commence removal proceedings.121
immigration detainers as “request[s] that such agency advise [DHS],
prior to release of the alien, in order for [DHS] to arrange to assume
custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is
either impracticable or impossible.”122 Immigration detainers serve
three key functions: (1) to notify a local LEA that ICE intends to take
custody of a noncitizen once she is no longer in the LEA’s custody;
(2) to request information about the noncitizen’s impending release
from the LEA’s custody so ICE can assume custody before the
noncitizen’s release; and (3) to request that the LEA maintain
custody of the noncitizen for up to forty-eight hours “(excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) to provide ICE time to assume
custody.”123 In December 2012, ICE issued new guidelines related to
immigration detainer enforcement that clarified that ICE officers
should only issue detainers in circumstances consistent with ICE’s
priorities to target violent or dangerous criminal offenders.124
By statute, immigration detainers can be issued only for controlled
substance offenses.125 Federal regulations, however, do not explicitly
state the offenses for which immigration officers may issue a
detainer.126 Because the statute only permits detainers for controlled
substance offenses, some have argued that issuing detainers for other
offenses oversteps DHS’s power granted by the statute.127
Nonetheless, courts have upheld the power to issue immigration
detainers for any criminal offense because of the federal
government’s broad power to enforce immigration laws.128 While the
121. ICE issues a detainer before removal proceedings formally begin; removal
proceedings begin when ICE issues a Notice to Appear. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)
(2012). The actual immigration detainer form sent to the LEAs is the DHS Form I247. Department of Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (Dec. 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf.
122. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2014).
123. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2.
124. See December 2012 Morton Memo, supra note 6, at 1 (emphasizing the
importance of maintaining uniformity and transparency regarding ICE’s priorities).
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d).
126. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), the Secretary of Homeland
Security “shall establish regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he deems
necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.” 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3).
127. Cf. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits, supra note 26, at 186–87 (arguing that the scope of
the DHS’s power under the detainer regulations is broader than under the statute).
128. E.g., Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644
F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that detainers could be enforced
under DHS’s broad power to enforce anything immigration-related and that the
regulations were not inconsistent with congressional intent); see also Uroza v. Salt
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regulation’s scope remains controversial, immigration detainers are
clearly issued for a broad range of offenses.129
Furthermore, the regulation suggests that the LEA must maintain
custody of the noncitizen under an immigration detainer because of
its language stating that the LEA “shall” maintain custody of the
noncitizen for a forty-eight hour period, excluding weekends and
holidays.130 The use of the word “shall” has created confusion among
LEAs about the mandatory nature of detainers.131 However, no circuit
court has interpreted immigration detainers as mandatory orders to
maintain custody; rather, courts that have addressed the issue have
determined that immigration detainers are voluntary requests and that
state and local law enforcement can choose not to enforce them.132
C. Constitutional Protections Applicable to Individuals Held Under
Immigration Detainers
Significant constitutional protections apply to noncitizens, including
protections under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.133

Lake Cnty., No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *1, *3 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2013)
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1357, and finding that federal agents who issued a detainer
against a college student detained by an LEA for thirty-six days were not acting
outside of the scope of their statutory power).
129. See TRAC, ICE Detainers, supra note 30 (determining that the three most
frequent criminal convictions for which detainers were issued were driving under the
influence of alcohol, ordinary traffic offenses, and simple marijuana possession).
130. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
131. See Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 38 (D.R.I. 2014) (criticizing
the state correctional facility’s policy to enforce all immigration detainers when such
detainers are not mandatory to enforce, as well as, in the instant case, because the
detainer was “facially invalid”); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., RESTORING
TRUST: HOW IMMIGRATION DETAINERS IN MARYLAND UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY
THROUGH UNNECESSARY ENFORCEMENT 10–11 (2013), https://immigrantjustice.org/
sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/ACLU%20Maryland—Detainer%20Report.pdf
(explaining the distinctions between immigration detainers and criminal warrants,
administrative warrants, and criminal detainers).
132. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that the
use of “shall” does not change the entire meaning of the relevant regulation that
identifies detainers as “requests”); Ortega v. U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 737 F.3d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that detainers require
ICE to “ask[]” the LEA to keep a person in custody); Liranzo v. United States, 690
F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2012) (defining detainers as “request[s]”); United States v.
Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175 (D. Or. 2012) (concluding that there was
no legal requirement to continue to hold the defendant in custody under an
immigration detainer after he had been released on his own recognizance by a
magistrate judge); see also Letter from Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Mike Thompson, Member, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 25, 2014) (stating that immigration detainers are “not
mandatory as a matter of law”).
133. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 369 (2003) (“[F]oreign nationals are generally
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, to political freedoms of speech and
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Individuals held under immigration detainers encounter Fourth
Amendment protections both when the detainer is issued and
following the forty-eight hour period.134 The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment also protects noncitizens in custody if
they are held for a prolonged period under a detainer.135
1.

Fourth Amendment protections
The Fourth Amendment protects both citizens and noncitizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures.136 In the criminal
context, a police officer must have reasonable suspicion that an
individual is involved in criminal activity in order to stop the
individual for questioning.137 After this initial, brief seizure, the
Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to justify an extended
restraint of liberty.138 Probable cause has been defined in terms of
“facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an
offense.”139
The test for probable cause is a totality of the
circumstances assessment.140 While such a determination deals with
probabilities rather than certainties, probable cause must be based on
a particular suspicion that warrants stopping or detaining an
individual; mere suspicion does not fulfill the probable cause

association, and to due process requirements of fair procedure where their lives,
liberty, or property are at stake.”).
134. See Pierce v. Multnomah Cnty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the
Fourth Amendment “to assess the constitutionality of the duration of or legal justification
for a prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody” (emphasis omitted)).
135. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).
136. E.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95, 101–02 (2005) (concluding that
officers’ questioning of an individual concerning her immigration status while she
was detained in handcuffs was reasonable and did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation because the questioning did not increase the amount of time
that the individual was detained); Orhorhaghe v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 38 F.3d 488, 496–97 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that immigration agents’ decision
to arrest a noncitizen with lawful status because of his “Nigerian-sounding name”
constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
137. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 31–32 (1968) (explaining that the officer must
draw “reasonable inferences . . . from the facts in light of his experience”).
138. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 125 (1975).
139. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983) (reasoning that a totality of
the circumstances approach avoids the challenges of applying the “rigid” tests
previously used to determine probable cause).
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requirement.141 Prolonged detention solely for investigatory purposes
does not satisfy probable cause and is therefore unconstitutional.142
By contrast, warrantless arrests in the immigration context require
an officer to have a “reason to believe” that an individual has violated
immigration law.143 The “reason to believe” standard has been
equated with probable cause.144 Even so, immigration officers have
been granted greater flexibility with regards to their tactics when
questioning and arresting individuals.145 The federal regulations
nonetheless provide that the arresting officer must present the
arrested alleged noncitizen before a neutral immigration officer, or
in other words, “an officer other than the arresting officer.”146 The
Supreme Court has defended these limited protections for
noncitizens detained by immigration enforcement by insisting that
these interactions are civil in nature and, therefore, do not trigger
141. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); see United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (“Based upon that whole picture the detaining
officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.”).
142. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983) (permitting only temporary
investigative stops that last no longer than needed for officers to dispel or confirm
their suspicions); see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216 (finding that “detention for
custodial interrogation . . . intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest”).
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2012). Specifically,
[a]ny officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant . . . to
arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so
arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and
is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the
alien arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay for examination
before an officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their
right to enter or remain in the United States.
Id. § 1357(a)(2) (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975); Lau v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Tejeda-Mata v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing cases
and finding a sufficient basis for the immigration officer’s warrantless arrest under
the “reason to believe” standard because the officer had probable cause). The
phrase “reason to believe” in other immigration statutes has also been equated with
probable cause. See In re A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 788–89 (B.I.A. 2005) (noting that
the Board of Immigration Appeals has relied on probable cause cases in interpreting
the phrase “reasonable ground to believe” under the terrorism and national security
grounds in the INA).
145. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95 (2005) (determining that an officer did
not need to have an independent reasonable suspicion to question the defendant
about her immigration status while executing a valid search warrant); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (holding that immigration
officers who questioned individual workers in a factory raid did not seize the workers
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because “the circumstances of the
encounter [were not] so intimidating . . . that a reasonable person would have
believed he was not free to leave”).
146. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a) (2014).
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criminal procedural protections.147 Additionally, although Border
Patrol agents have greater flexibility when searching individuals and
vehicles at the border,148 the Supreme Court has held that Border
Patrol agents must have probable cause or consent to detain
individuals for a prolonged period of time.149
Law enforcement must have probable cause if the seizure involves
anything more than the brief and narrowly defined intrusion
authorized by Terry v. Ohio.150 The Supreme Court has also stated that
detaining individuals solely to determine their immigration status
would raise constitutional concerns.151 Furthermore, at least one
federal district court has found that the issuance of the immigration
detainer is a “new seizure[].”152 Consequently, the officer must make
a new probable cause determination independent of any initial
probable cause finding associated with state law charges.153
After the initial seizure, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
neutral magistrate make a probable cause determination within fortyeight hours of the individual’s detention under an immigration
detainer.154 However, if a probable cause determination is not made
within forty-eight hours, including intervening weekends or holidays,
the burden of proof shifts to the government to demonstrate the
147. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1050 (1984) (establishing that the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation
proceedings). The Court further articulated that the “‘body’ or identity of a
defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible
as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search,
or interrogation occurred.” Id. at 1039.
148. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (finding no
constitutional violation when U.S. Border Patrol officers referred motorists
selectively to a secondary inspection area based largely on the motorists’
apparent Mexican ancestry); cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
273 (1973) (holding that the warrantless search of an automobile without
probable cause was not justified as a border search, which requires less justification
than probable cause, and therefore violated the petitioner’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures).
149. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (“In the context of
border area stops, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment
demands something more than . . . broad and unlimited discretion . . . .”).
150. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir.
1983), overruled on other grounds en banc by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199
F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
151. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012) (finding that a
practice of stopping individuals solely to verify their immigration status would
require state law enforcement officers to hold noncitizens “without federal
direction and supervision”).
152. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at *9 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
153. See id. at *9–10 (finding that the local jail violated the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights because it enforced an immigration detainer that was not
supported by probable cause).
154. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
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existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance to continue to hold the individual.155
Although there is no requirement to go before a neutral magistrate
in order to make a probable cause determination in the immigration
context,156 immigration officers must issue the noncitizen a Notice to
Appear (NTA) within forty-eight hours after the arrest.157 An NTA
not only communicates the charges to the noncitizen in removal
proceedings, but it also serves to inform the noncitizen that she may
seek counsel.158
Federal regulation and ICE’s implementing
guidelines permit a great deal of flexibility when enforcing this fortyeight hour rule by providing an exception for an emergency or
extraordinary circumstances.159
2.

Due process protections
Due process protects individuals held beyond forty-eight hours
because they are deprived of their liberty for a prolonged period.160
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to noncitizens.161 Just
as they have for Fourth Amendment protections, courts have
articulated different due process standards in the immigration
155. Id. at 57.
156. Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
157. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d).
158. Removal proceedings must be initiated with written notice to the respondent
that specifies, inter alia, the nature of the proceedings, the acts or conduct alleged to
be in violation of the law, the charges against the noncitizen, and the statutory
provisions the noncitizen allegedly violated. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012).
159. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d); see Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary,
Border & Transp. Security, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, to Michael J. Garcia,
Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and Robert Bonner,
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 3 (Mar. 30, 2004) (defining “emergency or
other extraordinary circumstance” to mean “a significant infrastructure or logistical
disruption,” “a compelling law enforcement need,” or “[i]ndividual facts or
circumstances unique to the [noncitizen],” like the need for medical care); see also
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U.
MEM. L. REV. 853, 874–76 (2008) (criticizing ICE guidelines for creating a loophole
in its own policy by providing an overly broad definition of emergency or
extraordinary circumstances).
160. See Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment governs the period of confinement between arrest without a warrant
and the preliminary hearing at which a determination of probable cause is made,
while due process regulates the period of confinement after the initial determination
of probable cause.”).
161. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (holding that noncitizens
in deportation proceedings are entitled to due process); The Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1902) (establishing that noncitizens have a right to due
process before deportation, regardless of what their immigration status is in the
United States); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (determining that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to noncitizens because it uses the word “person”
instead of the word “citizen”).
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context. For example, a person subject to criminal charges is
afforded the right to counsel,162 among other protections, but
noncitizens have no such rights in removal proceedings.163
Prior to 2003, the Supreme Court recognized significant limitations
on preventive detention of noncitizens.164 However, following the
Court’s ruling in Demore v. Kim,165 due process protections for
noncitizens have been severely limited.166 In Kim, the Supreme Court
held that the mandatory detention of noncitizens without
individualized determinations regarding their detention while
removal proceedings were pending did not violate their
constitutional rights.167 Mr. Kim challenged the constitutionality of a
statutory provision in the INA that establishes mandatory detention
of noncitizens who have committed certain criminal offenses.168 The
Court in Kim noted that this provision applies only to certain classes

162. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (establishing that
criminal defendants must be provided “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the [criminal] proceedings” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
163. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050
(1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings);
see also Pauw, supra note 41, at 309–10 (discussing constitutional safeguards that apply
in criminal proceedings that do not apply in deportation proceedings, such as the
right to a trial by jury and limitations under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
164. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (“[W]e have upheld preventive detention
based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and
subject to strong procedural protections.”).
165. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
166. Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural Reform in
“Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 54–55
(2006) (advocating for stronger protections for potentially deportable noncitizens
during Joseph hearings after the Supreme Court severely limited the due process
rights of noncitizens who had conceded deportability). Joseph hearings provide
noncitizens in removal proceedings the opportunity to contest the classification of
their criminal convictions as aggravated felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude,
which in effect challenges their placement in mandatory detention. In re Joseph, 22
I. & N. Dec. 799, 805 (B.I.A. 1999).
167. Kim, 538 U.S. at 531.
168. Id. The provision—8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)—is especially harsh because it
encompasses individuals who have committed “crimes involving moral turpitude,” a
dubious categorization that has led to a great deal of litigation surrounding its
application to certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B)–(C) (2012); see, e.g., JeanLouis v. Attorney Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 464, 482 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that
simple assault against a child under twelve years old was not a crime involving moral
turpitude); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (finding that a violation of an aggravated driving under the influence statute
was a crime involving moral turpitude). The consequences of Kim become even
more troubling considering that, since 2009, ICE has had a mandate to keep 34,000
beds in immigrant detention facilities full each day, a problematic aspect of
immigration detention beyond the scope of this Comment. See Ted Robbins, Little
Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-known-immigration-mandatekeeps-detention-beds-full (explaining the enormous costs of immigration detention
and suggesting alternatives to detention).
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of noncitizens convicted of crimes pending removal proceedings,
which suggests that this section does not apply if proceedings have
not yet been initiated with the issuance of an NTA.169
For those who have not had removal proceedings initiated against
them, such as individuals held under immigration detainers, their
continued detention raises questions about their entitlement to
procedural due process. In Mathews v. Eldridge,170 the Supreme Court
established a balancing test to determine what procedural safeguards
the Due Process Clause requires to ensure that a civil proceeding is
fundamentally fair.171 This analysis applies to noncitizens who have
entered the country.172 Under the Mathews test, courts weigh the
following factors: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest without additional procedural
safeguards; and (3) the nature of any countervailing interest in not
providing additional procedural safeguards.173 To find a violation of
due process, the private interest and erroneous deprivation of that
interest must outweigh the countervailing government interests.174 In
balancing these interests, courts must simply determine whether the
procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due
Process Clause rather than impose procedures that displace
congressional policy choices.175
Finally, as a mechanism to challenge their prolonged pretrial
detention and violations of their due process rights, individuals held
under immigration detainers may file habeas corpus petitions
demanding their release from custody.176 Habeas petitions have long
been vehicles for immigrant detainees to challenge their detention,
and such petitions are critical to allowing detained individuals to seek
169. Kim, 538 U.S. at 527–28. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) provides that ICE must
initiate removal proceedings by providing written notice to a noncitizen in the form
of an NTA. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).
170. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
171. Id. at 335.
172. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 35 (1982) (establishing that a
noncitizen, upon returning to the United States, can invoke the Due Process Clause
in deportation proceedings, but limiting the judiciary’s role to an assessment of
whether the procedures meet “the essential standard of fairness”).
173. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
174. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (concluding that the due
process rights of the petitioner, who was held in civil contempt for failing to pay child
support, were violated when he was not provided various procedural protections,
such as notice regarding his ability to pay as a primary issue in his civil contempt hearing
and an opportunity to provide information about his financial circumstances).
175. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34–35 (requiring that courts evaluate the particular
circumstances of each case when performing the balancing test).
176. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305
(2001) (“The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality
of Executive detention.”).
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their release.177 Petitioners must direct the habeas petitions to the
agencies that are detaining them.178 Consequently, an essential
aspect of determining whether to release petitioners wrongfully held
under immigration detainers is determining which agency, either at
the federal or the state level, has custody of them.
Because case law on immigration detainers is somewhat limited
and largely inconsistent, courts have not clarified what entity has
custody of an individual held under an immigration detainer.179
Some courts have held that individuals detained as a result of a
detainer are not in ICE custody.180 By contrast, at least one court has
found that in certain circumstances, an immigration detainer may
signify that the detainee is in ICE custody.181 In determining what
agency is liable for prolonged detention of an individual under an
ICE detainer, courts have analyzed the specific factual circumstances
under which the detainer was issued.182 A determination regarding
what agency has custody is significant in advancing habeas petitions
and targeting the appropriate wrongdoer for prolonged detention.183
3.

Criminal procedural protections when criminal cases are still pending
In circumstances where individuals with pending criminal cases
also have an immigration detainer initiated against them, the local
LEA has a clear alternative to enforcing the immigration detainer:
enforcing the pretrial detention order issued by the magistrate judge.

177. Id. at 305–06 (acknowledging the historical practice in immigration law of
filing writs of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of executive detention).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012).
179. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS:
LEGAL ISSUES 15–18 (2012) (commenting on cases that have considered the issue of
custody as it relates to immigration detainers and their differing results).
180. See Campos v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that an immigration detainer alone does not mean an individual is in ICE
custody and, thus, an individual with a detainer cannot file a writ of habeas corpus);
Orozco v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) (same); Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1988) (same).
181. See Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that the appellant was in immigration custody because he had a detainer plus a final
order of deportation against him).
182. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 637, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting
that the immigration detainer issued for the plaintiff was not accompanied by a
warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order and concluding that
Lehigh County, Pennsylvania may be liable for the plaintiff’s prolonged detention
because it could have disregarded the detainer); Uroza v. Salt Lake Cnty., No.
2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *7 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2013) (finding that federal
government actors might be held liable for the prolonged detention of the plaintiff
in the county jail because he remained detained after ICE issued an immigration
detainer for him).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (requiring that the writ be directed at the person who
has custody over the individual).
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In criminal cases, defendants have important protections
surrounding pretrial, preventive detention.184 Under federal law, the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA)185 provides that a pretrial detainee may
be detained further if she poses a flight risk or a public safety risk.186
Under the BRA, if a judicial officer187 has determined that a criminal
defendant does not pose a risk of flight or danger to the community,
then “the Executive Branch may no longer keep that person in
physical custody.”188 The Supreme Court upheld the BRA in United
States v. Salerno189 because it determined that this form of pretrial
detention did not amount to punishment before trial in violation of
the Due Process Clause; rather, such detention was purely regulatory.190
In cases where a noncitizen has a pending criminal case and an
immigration detainer, some federal courts have decided to enforce
pretrial detention determinations that were made in the noncitizen’s
pending criminal case rather than enforce the immigration
detainer.191 In United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez,192 the U.S. District Court
for the District of Oregon ordered ICE to release the defendant, who
faced charges of illegal reentry, from custody after a magistrate judge
had released him from physical custody because he did not present a

184. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is
the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”).
185. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141–3156).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The BRA is not without its critics. See Salerno, 481 U.S.
at 762–63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very pith and purpose of this statute is an
abhorrent limitation of the presumption of innocence.”); see also Shima Baradaran &
Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 505 (2012) (noting
that the definition of “danger” has been criticized as overbroad or vague in federal
and state bail statutes).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1) (defining a “judicial officer” as a “person or court
authorized . . . to detain or release a person before trial or sentencing or pending
appeal in a court of the United States, and any judge of the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia”).
188. United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1170 (D. Or. 2012).
189. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
190. Id. at 748.
191. E.g., United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442–43 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (overturning a detention order against the defendant who had been issued
an immigration detainer because the defendant was a “prime candidate for release”
under all BRA categories); Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (concluding that
the defendant should be released consistent with the magistrate judge’s
determination even though an immigration detainer was placed against him because
there was no statutory support for barring all noncitizens with immigration detainers
from release); United States v. Chavez-Rivas, 536 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968–69 (E.D. Wis.
2008) (denying the government’s motion to revoke the defendant’s release where he
did not pose a flight risk or danger to the community).
192. 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Or. 2012).
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public safety or flight risk.193 The court recognized that while an ICE
detainer may be a factor in the risk determination, it is but one factor
balanced against others.194 In determining that it should not enforce
the detainer, the court added that there was neither a legal nor a
practical requirement that it detain the defendant to remove and
deport him before the conclusion of his criminal proceeding.195
Other courts have reached similar conclusions and have refused to
overturn careful pretrial detention determinations based solely on
the issuance of an immigration detainer, thereby releasing the
noncitizen from ICE custody.196
D. Federalism Concerns
While the practical enforcement of immigration detainers clearly
implicates constitutional protections, state and local law
enforcement’s decision to enforce immigration detainers also
implicates federalism concerns. Two significant issues arise in the
context of immigration detainers:
preemption and anticommandeering. Anti-commandeering concerns federal intrusion
upon the states’ domain, while federal preemption concerns the
reverse: it serves to prevent states from intruding upon an area that is
controlled by the federal government.197
Under the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”198 This
provision rests upon a system of dual sovereignty that recognizes that
states retain certain powers, even though the states surrendered many
of their powers to the federal government when the Constitution was
enacted.199
Under a system of dual sovereignty, the federal
government cannot command states to administer federal regulatory

193. Id. at 1170 (explaining that if the Executive Branch chose not to release the
defendant, it would need to abandon criminal prosecution and only proceed with
removal and deportation).
194. Id. at 1173.
195. Id. at 1175.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Barrera-Omana, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (D.
Minn. 2009) (stating that permitting the pretrial detention of an individual under
solely an immigration detainer would be inconsistent with congressional intent);
United States v. Montoya-Vasquez, No. 4:08CR3174, 2009 WL 103596, at *5 (D. Neb.
Jan. 13, 2009) (“If Congress wanted to bar aliens with immigration detainers from
eligibility for release, it could readily have said so, but did not.”).
197. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“A
fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to
preempt state law.”).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
199. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997).
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programs.200 One of the most significant anti-commandeering cases,
Printz v. United States,201 challenged a provision in the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act that required state and local law
enforcement to perform background checks on individuals who
attempted to buy handguns.202 The Supreme Court struck down the
provision on anti-commandeering grounds and stated that the
federal government “may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . .
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty.”203 The Court articulated two additional
problems with delegating this authority to state and local
governments: (1) it forced state governments to absorb the costs of the
federal program, and (2) it put state governments in the position of
taking the blame for the additional burden or other related problems.204
Two years after Printz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in City of New York v. United States205 analyzed a New York City
ordinance that forbade city officials from transmitting information
about any individual’s immigration status to the federal government
unless it was required for a specified reason.206 The federal
directives at issue forbade the localities from restricting the
voluntary exchange of immigration information with immigration
authorities, but they did not compel the localities to perform any
specific action.207 In a prima facie challenge to these federal
directives brought by the City of New York, the court held that states
could not forbid all voluntary cooperation with federal programs
under the Tenth Amendment.208 Thus, if a program is voluntary or if
it requires state governments to perform certain tasks to receive
funding,209 the enlistment of state or local agencies is not
unconstitutional under anti-commandeering principles.
200. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999).
201. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
202. Id. at 902.
203. Id. at 935.
204. Id. at 930.
205. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 31.
207. Id. at 35.
208. Id.
209. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289
(1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal environmental statute because it
did not compel the state to comply with the statute’s provisions, to use any state
funds, or to even participate in the federal program); Kansas v. United States, 214
F.3d 1196, 1197, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that conditions placed on
states that accepted federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) funds
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For decades, courts have held that Congress has the power to expel
or exclude noncitizens and that its exercise of this power is largely
immune from judicial control.210 Accordingly, preemption has been
used to strike down various state immigration laws.211 Even though
federal law clearly commands immigration issues, the Supreme Court
has upheld state statutes that are consistent with federal immigration
policy and do not expand, conflict, or hinder such policies.212 The
most notable recent preemption case related to immigration is
Arizona v. United States,213 which involved a challenge to Arizona’s law,
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, known
as S.B. 1070.214 Federal law preempted three sections of S.B. 1070,
which criminalized behavior that was not criminalized under federal
law.215 Section 2(B) required that state officers reasonably attempt to
determine an individual’s immigration status if there was reasonable
suspicion that the person was a noncitizen or unlawfully present.216
The Court determined that section 2(B) would survive preemption if

did not implicate the anti-commandeering principle because states could refuse the
money and thus the conditions imposed by the statute).
210. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
(noting that admission to the United States is a privilege rather than a right and is
therefore subject to the procedure that the United States provides); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (stating that a nation has an “absolute and
unqualified” right to expel and deport foreigners).
211. E.g., United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012)
(sympathizing with the State of Alabama’s concerns associated with a large influx
of undocumented immigrants but holding ultimately that federal law preempted
various sections of the state statute), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013). There are
three types of preemption: (1) express preemption, which requires a federal law
that expressly demonstrates Congress’ pre-emptive intent; (2) field preemption,
which means that Congress has occupied a field for its exclusive governance; and (3)
conflict preemption, which occurs when state laws create an obstacle to
accomplishing fully the federal law. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2500–01 (2012).
212. E.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509–10 (holding that section 2(B) of Arizona’s
law was not preempted because it could be implemented in a way that did not
conflict with federal law); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987
(2011) (holding that an Arizona law that allowed suspension and revocation of
business licenses for employing unauthorized immigrant workers and that required
every employer to verify employment eligibility of hired employees through a
specific Internet-based system was not preempted because it did not conflict with the
federal scheme and was consistent with federal policy related to immigrants working
without authorization).
213. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
214. Id. at 2497.
215. The Court struck down section 3, which made failure to comply with federal
alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; section 5(C), which made it a
misdemeanor for an unauthorized noncitizen to seek or engage in work in the state;
and section 6, which authorized officers to arrest, without a warrant, any person who
the officer had probable cause to believe had committed any public offense that
made the person removable from the United States. Id. at 2501–07.
216. Id. at 2509.
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it required state officers to perform a status check during a lawful,
authorized detention.217
While courts have yet to take up this issue, scholars and advocates
from both sides of the immigration enforcement debate have
considered preemption in the immigration detainer context. Those
who support enforcing detainers have argued that states’ refusal to
enforce detainers is preempted.218 Consistent with this view, at least
one court has held that an LEA’s enforcement of certain
immigration laws is likewise not preempted.219 On the other hand,
those who oppose enforcement of immigration detainers have argued
that state compliance with federal detainers is preempted.220 The
question of preemption as it relates to immigration detainers is
significant because a growing number of localities refuse to enforce
immigration detainers.221
II. ANALYSIS
The enforcement of immigration detainers in practice has led to
constitutional violations at two distinct periods in time: when the
detainer is issued and at the conclusion of the forty-eight hour
period. As discussed below, ICE and local agents deputized by ICE
frequently issue immigration detainers without probable cause, and
local LEAs hold individuals under detainers for a period beyond that
which is permissible.222 The potential that detainers and detainer
enforcement will violate individuals’ constitutional rights drives a

217. Id.
218. E.g., Complaint in Chancery for Mandamus & Declaratory Relief at 4,
McCann v. Dart, No. 2013CH10583 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. Apr. 22, 2013) (alleging that
Cook County, Illinois has a legal duty to enforce immigration detainers because the
federal government has ultimate authority over immigration matters); CAL. SENATE
PUB. SAFETY COMM., STATE GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY ENFORCEMENT,
AB 4, at 7 (2013) (questioning whether a proposed California bill to limit
immigration detainer enforcement would be unconstitutional because it “would
permit a local policy to trump federal law”).
219. E.g., United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that allowing state and local law enforcement to arrest
undocumented noncitizens would interfere with Congress’s intent regarding
immigration enforcement).
220. E.g., Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under
Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 293–300 (2013)
[hereinafter Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement] (arguing that
Congress has clearly delineated circumstances under which immigration officers may
make immigration arrests and noting that immigration detainers are not among
those enumerated circumstances).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 337–48 (providing examples of jurisdictions
that have adopted rules to limit local enforcement of detainers, in whole or in part).
222. See infra Part II.A–B (analyzing the constitutional violations that result from
the enforcement of immigration detainers).
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need to establish greater procedural protections for them, such as
additional safeguards to ensure the release of detainees after fortyeight hours and reliance on individualized determinations made by
judicial officers in the detainees’ criminal cases.
A. Local Law Enforcement and ICE Violate the Fourth Amendment when
They Issue and Enforce Detainers Without Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment protects all persons, both citizens and
noncitizens, against unreasonable searches and seizures.223 Although
a police officer can seize an individual based on reasonable suspicion,
any extended detention must be supported by probable cause.224
Probable cause is a common-sense determination based on the
totality of the circumstances and requires a certain level of
particularity.225 Significantly, the “reason to believe” standard in the
immigration context has been interpreted to be equivalent to
Although federal law does not require
probable cause.226
immigration officers to have an independent reasonable suspicion to
question an individual’s immigration status when she is arrested or
seized for criminal violations,227 officers must provide an independent
probable cause determination to detain an individual.228
Furthermore, at least one U.S. district court has held that
enforcement of an immigration detainer constitutes a new seizure,
thus requiring the LEA enforcing the immigration detainer to
provide a new probable cause determination.229
An immigration officer may issue an immigration detainer against
an individual for any one of four reasons. On the Department of
Homeland Security’s Immigration Detainer - Notice of Action form,

223. CONST. amend. IV; e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 96–97 (2005) (applying
Fourth Amendment analysis to the seizure of a lawful permanent resident).
224. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1979) (explaining that Terry
provided one narrow exception that seizures must be based on probable cause for “a
brief, on-the-spot stop on the street and a frisk for weapons”).
225. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983); see Maryland v. Pringle, 540
U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (defining probable cause as a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt that must be “particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized”).
226. See cases cited supra note 144.
227. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101 (finding that the officers did not need
independent reasonable suspicion to question the individual about her place of birth
and immigration status because the questioning was not a “seizure” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
228. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975).
229. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (holding that the county violated the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by continuing to hold her under the
immigration detainer at two distinct moments: after she was eligible for pre-trial
release by posting bail and after her release from state charges).
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DHS Form I-247, three of the fields pertain to immigration
charges,230 and the final field indicates that DHS has a “reason to
believe” that the individual is a noncitizen subject to removal from
the United States, and one or more of the following conditions apply:
the individual (1) was previously convicted of a felony; (2) was
previously convicted of three or more misdemeanor offenses; (3) was
previously convicted of or charged with one or more enumerated
misdemeanor offenses; (4) was previously convicted of illegal entry;
(5) reentered the United States illegally after being removed from
the country; (6) was “found by an immigration officer or an
immigration judge to have knowingly committed immigration fraud”;
or (7) “poses a significant risk to national security, border security, or
public safety.”231 Based on the fields provided in this form, if an
individual is held solely for immigration charges, then the local LEA
has no particular reason to suspect the individual of criminal
activity;232 rather, the LEA chooses to hold the individual based on an
ICE officer’s belief concerning the individual’s immigration status.233
Before 2012, the officer issuing the detainer could mark a field on
the DHS Form I-247 that indicated that ICE had initiated an
investigation concerning the individual’s immigration status.234 The
use of this field as the sole justification for issuing the immigration
detainer led to a spate of lawsuits.235 The extended detention of
230. The fields related to solely immigration charges are: (1) “[i]nitiated removal
proceedings and served a Notice to Appear or other charging document”; (2)
“[s]erved a warrant of arrest for removal proceedings”; and (3) “[o]btained an order
of deportation or removal from the United States for this person.” Department of
Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, supra note 121, at 1.
231. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also December 2012 Morton Memo, supra note 6,
at 1–2 (stating that enforcement of immigration detainers in the delineated
circumstances is consistent with ICE’s enforcement priorities).
232. As courts have noted on various occasions, mere presence in the United
States without documentation is not a crime. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2505 (2012); Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)
(stating that federal law does not criminalize unlawful presence).
233. See Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D.R.I. 2014) (permitting
a Fourth Amendment violation claim to proceed where a correctional facility should have
recognized that an immigration detainer issued for the defendant was facially invalid).
234. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: AN
OVERVIEW FOR STATE DEFENSE COUNSEL III. app. B (2011), available at http://www.ilrc.
org/ files/documents/pa_understanding_immigration_detainers_05-2011.pdf.
235. See, e.g., Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citing Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509)
(holding that an investigation initiated by ICE was “not enough to establish probable
cause because the Fourth Amendment does not permit seizures for mere
investigations”); Uroza v. Salt Lake Cnty., No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *5
(D. Utah Feb. 21, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff had a sufficient constitutional
claim that he was held without probable cause after the ICE officer issued a detainer
that indicated that ICE had initiated an investigation into the plaintiff’s
deportability); Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief & Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 2, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2011)
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someone solely for investigative purposes violates the Fourth
Amendment.236 Thus, the change in the immigration detainer form
appears to have ameliorated this particular Fourth Amendment
violation—namely, issuing a detainer merely to investigate further.
Even with these changes, however, the Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) has reported that the changes have
not necessarily improved how ICE issues detainers.237 In one recent
study, for example, TRAC reported that ICE issued only fourteen
percent of the immigration detainers against individuals who posed a
threat to public safety or national security.238 TRAC found that in
nearly half of the detainers issued, no threat level was indicated
because the individual subject to the detainer had no prior criminal
convictions.239 Therefore, it is impossible that any of the criminal
deportation categories on the I-247 detainer form would apply to
these individuals because the categories all require a prior
conviction.240 The officer enforcing the detainer has no information
to rely upon other than the information provided in the detainer
itself—namely, information related to the individual’s immigration
status.241 But, a decision to enforce the detainer based solely on
(alleging that the immigration detainer was issued based solely on ICE’s initiation of
an investigation and that the plaintiffs were not provided with notice or an
administrative arrest warrant).
236. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975). The Supreme Court has also
warned that detention for the sole purpose of determining an individual’s
immigration status raises constitutional concerns. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509; see also
Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers after Arizona v. United States, 46
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 675 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Detainers after Arizona]
(applying the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment discussion to detainer
regulations and concluding that the regulations are invalid insofar as they “raise[]
these substantial constitutional issues”).
237. See New ICE Detainer Guidelines Have Little Impact, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 1, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/333
(reporting that six months after ICE issued its new guidelines, nearly ninety percent
of detainers issued were not issued for people suspected of posing risks to public
safety or national security, as the guidelines required). See generally TRAC, Ice
Detainers, supra note 30 (describing TRAC).
238. TRAC, ICE Detainers, supra note 30.
239. Id. Data related to actual deportations supports this finding that the majority
of noncitizens caught by ICE have been convicted of minor crimes or do not have a
criminal record. See Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow
Minor Crimes, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r=0 (reporting that
only twenty percent of deportations since 2008 involved noncitizens who had been
convicted of serious crimes).
240. See text accompanying supra note 231 (listing the conditions under which an
immigration detainer may be issued when the individual has not been charged with
an immigration-related offense).
241. Some state and local correctional facilities have blanket policies to enforce all
immigration detainers, regardless of the factual circumstances of each case. E.g.,
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 639 (3d Cir. 2014) (alleging that Lehigh County,
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immigration status is insufficient for probable cause.242 Furthermore,
the individual’s detention under the detainer constitutes a new
seizure and therefore necessitates a new probable cause justification,
separate from that provided for the state allegations.243 Because
probable cause is required for prolonged seizures, using immigration
detainers to detain individuals without probable cause violates the
Fourth Amendment.244
B. Detention Beyond Forty-Eight Hours Violates the Fourth Amendment
and Due Process
1.

Unlawfully prolonged detention
The Fourth Amendment permits detention after a warrantless
arrest for only forty-eight hours, including weekends and holidays.245
This forty-eight hour window provides law enforcement with time to
address paperwork delays and logistical problems and is consistent
with the prohibition against detaining individuals for an extended
period of time after they have been arrested without probable
cause.246 Following the forty-eight hour period, the detainee must be
taken before a neutral body for a probable cause determination.247
The forty-eight hour limitation also applies in the immigration
context.
Within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest, an
immigration officer must determine whether the arrested individual
is subject to deportation.248 The enforcement of an immigration
detainer always constitutes a warrantless seizure because a detainer is
merely a request, not a warrant.249 Immigration detainer regulations

Pennsylvania had a policy to enforce all immigration detainers, even those lodged
against individuals without probable cause); Ortega v. U.S. Customs & Immigration
Enforcement, 737 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that the local correctional
facility’s policy was to incarcerate anyone with an immigration detainer).
242. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 893 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“[A]ny
stop or detention based only on a reasonable suspicion that a person is in the
country without authorization, without more facts, is not lawful.”), adhered to by No.
CV–07–02513–PHX–GMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013).
243. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at *9 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
244. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other
grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
245. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring a
probable cause determination within forty-eight hours, not including intervening
weekends, unless extraordinary circumstances arise).
246. Id. at 55.
247. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25 (1975).
248. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2014).
249. Id. § 287.3(a); see Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D.R.I.
2014) (analyzing the detainee’s prolonged seizure as a result of officers attempting
to use an immigration detainer as a warrant after the court concluded that
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permit LEAs to hold an individual for forty-eight hours, excluding
weekends and holidays.250 In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,251 the
Supreme Court weighed different concerns, including possible
logistical and paperwork delays, when it determined that a probable
cause determination for a warrantless arrest must be provided within
forty-eight hours, which includes weekends and holidays.252 Because
local LEAs hold individuals under solely immigration detainers,
which are not warrants, the County of Riverside analysis pertinent to
warrantless arrests applies here. Therefore, by holding an individual
beyond forty-eight hours under an immigration detainer without a
probable cause determination from a neutral immigration officer or
judge, local law enforcement violates the noncitizens’ Fourth
Amendment rights.253
Holding an individual under an immigration detainer beyond the
forty-eight hour period violates due process for two reasons: (1) the
Constitution prohibits local law enforcement from holding
individuals beyond forty-eight hours without a probable cause
determination,254 and (2) the detained individuals have not been
provided with procedural safeguards to ensure their immediate
release following the forty-eight hour period.255
Although ICE does not authorize local LEAs to hold an individual
beyond forty-eight hours under an immigration detainer,256 many of
detainers and warrants are very different); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 911 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (“A detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather
a voluntary request . . . .”).
250. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d); see Cnty. of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56 (holding that probable
cause determinations made within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest comply
with the Gerstein v. Pugh “promptness requirement”).
251. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
252. Id. at 55–56.
253. Cf. Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(finding that it is not necessary to take a deportable noncitizen before a magistrate as
long as officers comply fully with immigration procedures outlined in the federal
regulations); see also Lasch, Detainers after Arizona, supra note 236, at 698 (arguing
that the federal regulation that permits detention for forty-eight hours excluding
holidays and weekends violates the Fourth Amendment because the Supreme Court
in County of Riverside declared expressly that the Fourth Amendment requires a
probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate within forty-eight hours of an
arrest “including weekends and holidays”).
254. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25 (1975); see also Department of Homeland
Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, supra note 121, at 1 (instructing
local law enforcement that they “are not authorized to hold the subject beyond . . .
[forty-eight] hours”).
255. See Department of Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action,
supra note 121, at 2 (providing that detained individuals should contact the LEA if
they are not released within forty-eight hours, not including weekends or holidays).
256. See Rivas v. Martin, 781 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782–83 (N.D. Ind. 2011)
(distinguishing the detention of an individual pursuant to an expired immigration
detainer, which may violate the Constitution, from the detention of an individual
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the individuals held solely under an immigration detainer are in
custody for more than forty-eight hours.257 Some state and local LEAs
do not understand that detention beyond this period is not permitted
and that prolonged detention of an individual exposes them to
liability.258 In their current form, immigration detainers notify
immigrant detainees that they cannot be held beyond forty-eight
hours and place the burden upon the detainees to alert law
enforcement if the period has expired.259 Instead, LEAs should
promulgate clear guidelines requiring the release of individuals
immediately after forty-eight hours.260
Procedural due process under Mathews v. Eldridge
Detained individuals are entitled to procedural due process
because their liberty is at stake.261 In determining whether a
particular procedure in civil proceedings meets the standard of
fairness under the Due Process Clause, the procedure must satisfy the
2.

under a valid warrant); Ochoa v. Bass, 181 P.3d 727, 733 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008)
(finding that the State of Oklahoma lacked authority to continue to hold the
defendants following the expiration of the immigration detainers without further
action by ICE).
257. While data is not available that demonstrates the frequency of this practice,
individuals who have been held beyond the forty-eight hour period have sued LEAs
in several U.S. district courts. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief
& Damages at 3–4, Roy v. Cnty. of L.A., No. 2:12-cv-9012-RGK-FFM (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
2012) (alleging the Los Angeles County jails unlawfully detained individuals subject
to immigration detainers for periods ranging from six to eighty-nine days); Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4,
Brizuela v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2012) (stating that
individuals held under immigration detainers in Connecticut have been detained for
up to five days before being taken into ICE custody); Plaintiff’s Original Complaint,
supra note 1, at 4–5 (complaining that Orleans Parish Prison unlawfully held one
plaintiff for 164 days and another plaintiff for ninety-one days); Complaint & Jury
Demand at 1, 5, Quezada v. Mink, No. 1:10-00879-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2010)
(noting the Jefferson County, Colorado jail held the plaintiff for forty-seven days).
258. E.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D.R.I. 2014)
(permitting a claim of a Fourth Amendment violation against the State of Rhode
Island to proceed against the state because the correctional facility should have
recognized that the immigration detainer was facially invalid).
259. Department of Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action,
supra note 121, at 2.
260. E.g., Settlement Agreement & Stipulation of Dismissal Upon Termination of
Agreement at 12–13, Brizuela v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226 (D. Conn. Feb. 19,
2013) (explaining that the Connecticut Department of Corrections agreed to
develop a procedure to inform its internal staff and detainees about immigration
detainers and to provide the procedure to all inmates subject to detainers).
261. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily
restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (characterizing the “root requirement” of due process as
providing an individual an opportunity for a hearing before depriving the individual
of a liberty or a property interest (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Mathews balancing test.262 The first Mathews factor—the private
interest affected by official action—is substantial in this context
because individuals subject to immigration detainers are held in
custody and thus deprived of their liberty at the most basic level.263
The Supreme Court has recognized the severity of depriving an
individual of her liberty, especially in the pretrial context.264 Such
deprivation is considerable with immigration detainers. LEAs frequently
hold individuals under detainers for extended periods of time
without any indication of the charges that they face; some individuals
have been held for months solely under an immigration detainer.265
In addition to the deprivation of liberty, the enforcement of
immigration detainers also places other liberty interests at stake. In
some jurisdictions, individuals held under immigration detainers are
categorically ineligible for bond in criminal proceedings.266
Consequently, individuals held under immigration detainers are
subject to lengthier stays in pretrial detention as a result of their
criminal cases than are those not subject to immigration detainers.267
In addition, noncitizens may have other concerns related to the
nature of their detention, like remaining in a minimum security
facility, because individuals held under immigration detainers are
sometimes placed in medium security facilities.268 Their liberty
262. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see supra notes 170–75 and
accompanying text (discussing the Mathews test).
263. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425
(1979) (requiring due process protections for all civil commitments).
264. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty
is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (recognizing the serious
consequences of prolonged pretrial detention, such as job loss, interruption in
income, and impairment of family relationships).
265. See supra note 257 (listing multiple complaints that alleged that law
enforcement violated due process rights by holding noncitizens under immigration
detainers for more than forty-eight hours).
266. See KATE M. MANUEL, supra note 179, at 19 n.128 (clarifying that even if a
jurisdiction does not categorically refuse bond hearings to immigration detainees,
the presence of the detainer may nonetheless influence their bail determinations).
This prohibition is especially problematic when the individual is charged with a
minor offense because the individual is probably not subject to mandatory detention
and may be eligible for bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)
(2012) (granting the Attorney General discretion to determine whether to detain
noncitizens in removal proceedings or to release them on bond).
267. See, e.g., GUTTIN, supra note 34, at 7–8 (reporting that noncitizens held under
immigration detainers spend more time in criminal pretrial detention because they
are less likely to be released on bail); see also Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory
Relief & Damages at 6, Roy v. Cnty. of L.A., No. 2:12-cv-9012-RGK-FFM (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 19, 2012) (alleging that inmates in Los Angeles County jail with immigration
detainers are typically held 20.6 days longer than inmates without detainers).
268. Cf. Franklin v. Barry, 909 F. Supp. 21, 29 (D.D.C. 1995) (determining that the
entitlement to a minimum security transfer is not a protected liberty interest and that
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interests are further implicated because they may not be able to seek
assistance for their pending criminal cases while they are detained.269
Because immigration detainers emerge in a variety of contexts and
may lead to different outcomes, the analysis regarding the private
interests at stake will vary based on the circumstances.
The second Mathews factor—the comparative risk of an erroneous
deprivation of an individual’s private liberty interest with and without
additional or substitute procedural safeguards—also weighs heavily in
favor of the detained noncitizens. The erroneous deprivation of the
noncitizen’s liberty interest is great, and a failure to provide any
procedural protections has led to the detention of U.S. citizens270 and
noncitizens for well over 100 days solely under immigration
detainers.271 The erroneous enforcement of immigration detainers
has also burdened immigrant communities—particularly Latino
communities—because they lose trust in local law enforcement, a
consequence that can negatively impact public safety.272
Implementing specific safeguards,273 such as training LEAs to
recognize invalid detainers or to release individuals immediately after
forty-eight hours, would significantly diminish the risk of erroneous
or prolonged deprivation of liberty.
plaintiffs’ equal protection rights were not violated because all individuals with any
type of detainer are denied transfers to minimum security facilities).
269. See United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1180 (D. Or. 2012)
(recognizing that by sending the petitioner to a detention facility in another part of
the state, ICE deprived him of the support of his family and friends and also
deprived the petitioner’s court-appointed counsel of the ability to prepare a defense
in the petitioner’s criminal case); see also SEJAL ZOTA & JOHN RUBIN, IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 84 (John Rubin ed.,
2008), available at http://www.ncids.org/Other%20Manuals/Immigration%20Manual/
Text.htm (implying that indigent defense counsel often have difficulty communicating
with their clients when they are transferred to an immigration detention center).
270. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014) (detailing the
detention of a U.S. citizen under an immigration detainer who had a U.S. Social
Security card, a driver’s license, and a debit card in his wallet during booking); Uroza
v. Salt Lake Cnty., No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2014 WL 4457300, at *5 (D. Utah Sept. 10,
2014) (stating that ICE issued detainers for more than 800 U.S. citizens between
2008 and 2012); see also Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/us/measures-tocapture-illegal-aliens-nab-citizens.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (documenting instances in
which federal immigration agents erroneously instructed local law enforcement
agencies to hold U.S. citizens for possible deportation).
271. See sources cited supra note 257 (providing examples of individuals who have
sued LEAs for holding them for more than the allowable forty-eight hour period).
272. See infra Part III.A (discussing the consequences for immigrant communities
of merging local law enforcement’s traditional responsibilities with federal
immigration authorities’ responsibilities).
273. The current procedure does not include safeguards in excess of those
included on DHS Form I-247. The form only instructs the local agency holding the
subject of the detainer to release the individual after forty-eight hours. Department of
Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, supra note 121, at 1.
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The final factor under the Mathews analysis—the countervailing
interest—is the government’s interest in efficiently gaining custody
over noncitizens who may be deportable and in keeping potentially
deportable noncitizens who may be dangerous in custody.274 In
Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court articulated a concern for increased
rates of criminal activity committed by noncitizens.275 In that case,
the Court’s concern for recidivism of potentially deportable
noncitizens was so significant that the Court rejected arguments
about the need to provide an individualized determination of flight
risk for noncitizens detained under the statutory provision at issue, 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c).276 Noncitizens held under immigration detainers,
however, would not fall under the provision analyzed in Kim because
that section applies only when removal proceedings are pending.277
However, removal proceedings begin with the issuance of an NTA,278
and individuals held under immigration detainers have not usually
been issued an NTA. Thus, the mandatory detention provisions are
not triggered when an individual is held under an ICE detainer.
Additionally, most individuals held under immigration detainers
are nonviolent offenders, so the Supreme Court’s fear of dangerous
deportable criminals is unwarranted.279 The Supreme Court in Kim
permitted the mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted of
certain serious crimes, but classifying noncitizens’ criminal
convictions under these immigration provisions is extremely
challenging.280 An ICE officer who issued the detainer, or the local
274. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
275. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003) (citing a 1986 study that found
seventy-seven percent of deportable individuals were arrested at least one more time
and that forty-five percent were arrested more than once before the start of their
deportation proceedings).
276. Id. at 525–26. But see Whitney Chelgren, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It
Is Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1477, 1503–07 (2011) (arguing that detaining persons in ICE custody without
individualized hearings is unconstitutional because “the system essentially
presupposes that every immigrant who is subject to mandatory detention is either
dangerous or a flight risk, or both”).
277. Kim, 538 U.S. at 527–28. .
278. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012) (providing the substantive requirements
for an NTA).
279. See TRAC, ICE Detainers, supra note 30 (indicating that almost half of the
individuals held under immigration detainers had no criminal record); see also
Thompson & Cohen, supra note 239 (reporting that two-thirds of the nearly two
million deportations that have taken place during the Obama Administration were
of people who had no criminal record or who had committed minor infractions,
such as traffic violations).
280. Recent Supreme Court case law illustrates the challenges of classifying
criminal convictions for immigration purposes. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 1678, 1693–94 (2013) (noting that for the third time in seven years the Court
considered whether a low-level drug offense should be classified as an aggravated
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official who decided to enforce the detainer, is likely not in a position
to determine whether the individual would be subject to mandatory
detention when transferred to ICE custody.281 Consequently, the
government’s interest in detaining dangerous noncitizens is not
effectively addressed by immigration detainer enforcement.
The remaining government interest—the efficient adjudication of
potentially deportable noncitizens—is also not particularly weighty in
this context. Although immigration detainers may relieve the federal
government of the burden of tracking down individuals who may be
deportable, the state government’s interest actually weighs in favor of
greater procedural protections because a state pays the cost of
holding an individual under an immigration detainer.282 Therefore,
the government’s interest in efficient deportation proceedings, along
with the government’s interest in keeping potentially dangerous
individuals in custody, is relatively minor compared to the substantial
risk of prolonged detention of any individual charged with a
nonviolent offense, such as a minor traffic offense.283
Because the private liberty interest greatly outweighs the
government’s interests in efficient adjudication of deportation
proceedings or detention of supposed dangerous noncitizens, due
process requires that those subject to immigration detainers be
provided stronger procedural protections, even if they fall short of
more robust protections like a right to counsel.284 Form I-247 states
that detention is “not to exceed 48 hours;” however ICE then places
the burden on the noncitizen to ask the LEA to be released from

felony and clarifying that certain state drug offenses with no remuneration do not
qualify as aggravated felonies).
281. For example, adjudicators and courts have diverged regarding which test to
apply to determine if a crime involves moral turpitude, which under some
circumstances may trigger mandatory detention. Compare Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24
I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (B.I.A. 2008) (permitting adjudicators to examine documents
related to the criminal charge outside of the record of conviction), with Prudencio v.
Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 486 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the Silva-Trevino framework and
finding that the conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor was not a
crime involving moral turpitude).
282. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(e) (2014).
283. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (recognizing a liberty interest
of a noncitizen who was ordered removed but could not practically be deported).
284. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (establishing that
criminal defense attorneys must inform their clients if a guilty plea carries a clear risk
of deportation). In other civil proceedings, the Supreme Court has determined that
alternative procedural protections are necessary to ensure fairness of the proceeding,
even where the petitioner is not entitled to right to counsel. See Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that the petitioner’s due process rights were
violated because he was not afforded alternative procedural protections to ensure
fundamental fairness of a proceeding for failure to pay child support).
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custody.285 Regulations require immigration officers to inform
individuals arrested without a warrant of the immigration charges
pending against them and their right to counsel at their own
expense,286 but the only procedure for enforcing the detainer
requires that the LEA provide a copy of the detainer to the
Because
noncitizen against whom the detainer is issued.287
procedural steps are already in place to inform noncitizens arrested
without a warrant, procedural steps in the detainer context would
impose a minimal burden. Additionally, immigration officers should
clearly communicate to the local LEA detaining the individual that
ICE does not intend to take custody of the detainee so that the LEA
releases the individual immediately after the forty-eight hour period.
These procedural steps, while relatively minor, will likely prevent the
prolonged detention of individuals held under detainers. These
measures are both significant and minimally burdensome, and they
would protect the liberty interest of individuals held under
immigration detainers so as to satisfy due process.
C. Local Law Enforcement Should Rely on Individualized Determinations
Rather than Automatically Enforce Immigration Detainers
Instead of enforcing immigration detainers, local law enforcement
should respect the assessment of danger and flight risk made in the
noncitizen’s criminal case. Because individuals subject to detainers
have often been arrested on unrelated criminal charges, they
frequently have pending criminal cases. In some circumstances, the
criminal court judge may release the individuals on bond or on their
own recognizance.288 In the case of Mr. Alvarez-Trujillo, who had
criminal charges pending against him, a magistrate judge issued an
order of conditional release based on his strong family ties, including
three U.S.-citizen children, stable employment, and presence in the
United States for a long period of time.289 In cases like Mr. Alvarez285. DHS Form I-247 provides that an individual subject to the detainer cannot be
held beyond forty-eight hours, but nothing else indicates to local law enforcement
that the person must be released after forty-eight hours. Department of Homeland
Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, supra note 121, at 1 (including a
field on the form where the officer issuing the detainer may instruct the LEA
enforcing the detainer to provide a form to the detained individual).
286. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c).
287. Department of Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action,
supra note 121, at 1.
288. E.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2014) (assessing the claim
of a criminal defendant who was released on bond but held three additional days
pursuant to an immigration detainer).
289. United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (D. Or. 2012)
(citation omitted).
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Trujillo’s, ICE issues an immigration detainer to hold individuals
even after they have been released on bond or on their own
recognizance.290 Even if ICE has probable cause to issue that
detainer, case law, common sense, and fundamental fairness support
the release of the defendant pending a criminal proceeding.291
In the criminal context, factors such as flight risk and a criminal
defendant’s potential dangerousness are sufficient to maintain
custody of a criminal defendant before trial.292 Accordingly, state and
local law enforcement should enforce the custody orders of the
individualized judicial determinations made in a noncitizen’s
pending criminal case, as opposed to relying solely on the
immigration detainer to justify a noncitizen’s continued detention.
Courts have recognized that an ICE detainer may be a factor in the
risk determination, but it is one factor balanced against others.293
Courts have also found that the immigration detainer cannot trump
determinations made under the Bail Reform Act because it would
undo Congress’s carefully constructed scheme that has been
implemented to determine if a criminal defendant should be placed
in pretrial detention.294 In Mr. Alvarez-Trujillo’s case, he was even in
290. Id.; see also Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014
WL 1414305, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (articulating the local jail’s practice of
holding individuals subject to ICE detainers in custody, even when their underlying
state criminal charges are resolved or bail is posted).
291. See, e.g., Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (finding that there was no
practical necessity or legal requirement that an individual remain in custody under
an immigration detainer when he had pending criminal charges and a magistrate
judge had determined he could be released pending those charges). In TrujilloAlvarez, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon added that detaining Mr.
Alvarez-Trujillo in an ICE facility outside of the jurisdiction where his criminal case
was pending deprived him of his family and friends’ support and of the ability to
meet with his court-appointed counsel to prepare his defense at trial, thus
jeopardizing his constitutional rights. Id. at 1180.
292. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (stating that the
government’s interest in detaining potentially dangerous individuals sometimes
outweighs an individual’s liberty interest).
293. E.g., United States v. Chavez-Rivas, 536 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968–69 (E.D. Wis.
2008) (balancing the defendant’s immigration status with other factors, such as
family ties and stable employment, and concluding that he did not pose a flight risk).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Blas, No. CRIM. 13-0178-WS-C, 2013 WL 5317228, at
*6 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 20, 2013) (declining to recognize an immigration detainer
exception to the Bail Reform Act); United States v. Barrera-Omana, 638 F. Supp.
2d 1108, 1111 (D. Minn. 2009) (rejecting the notion that all the factors weighed in
the BRA, including danger and flight risk, are completely “swallowed by an ICE
detainer”). Individuals held under immigration detainers have been treated as
pretrial detainees in other contexts as well. See Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t, 709 F.3d
563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (analyzing an Eight Amendment claim of a woman held
under an immigration detainer under the same standards as a pretrial detainee);
Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment protections for immigration detainees identically to those
of pretrial detainees).
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ICE custody,295 a significant fact that demonstrates even more
strongly that if ICE cannot detain an individual who has been
otherwise released under a detainer, then surely local law enforcement
lacks authority to further hold someone on immigration charges.
Even though Trujillo-Alvarez related to the BRA, a federal statute,
state criminal procedural codes also base pretrial custody
determinations on specific factors, such as flight risk and the
potential danger that the defendant poses to the community.296
These individualized judicial determinations rely upon an established
framework and should be enforced instead of immigration detainers,
which are often based on less than probable cause.297 While local law
enforcement may believe that a federal request should overcome a
state or local determination to release the person, state and local
agencies are not required to enforce immigration detainers.298 As the
court found in Trujillo-Alvarez, there is neither a legal requirement
nor a practical requirement that the detainer be enforced because a
judge has already determined that the person released on bond or on
her own recognizance will most likely return to court.299 In both
federal and state pretrial detention determinations, the individual
would certainly be released but for the immigration detainer.300
Following individualized judicial determinations of flight risk as
opposed to immigration detainers protects state and local agencies
from potential constitutional violations, and it is also consistent with
federal immigration policies.301
Although these protections borrowed from criminal procedure
may be useful in releasing noncitizens who would otherwise be held
under an immigration detainer, advocating for such protections also

295. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
296. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 903.046(2)(d) (2014) (“[A] court shall consider . . .
[t]he defendant’s past and present conduct, including any record of convictions,
previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings.”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.21.050(3)(c) (2014) (including the “seriousness of the
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s
release” as a factor judicial officers must consider when deciding whether to release
an individual from custody).
297. See supra Part II.A (analyzing how the enforcement of immigration detainers
violates the Fourth Amendment).
298. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
299. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
300. See United States v. Barrera-Omana, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (D. Minn.
2009) (asserting that the “presence of an ICE detainer” should not be dispositive in
pretrial detention determinations because “[a]bsent this detainer, there would be no
question: the defendant should be released pending trial”).
301. See December 2012 Morton Memo, supra note 6, at 2 (revising the ICE
detainer policy to target only individuals convicted of certain criminal offenses or
subject to specific immigration offenses).
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further entrenches immigration enforcement in criminal law and
procedure.302 Even in the case of pretrial criminal detention,
however, the Supreme Court upheld the BRA, the federal statute
governing individualized determinations, as a regulatory rather than
a punitive measure.303 Consequently, even if advocates were to
successfully frame removal proceedings as quasi-criminal and
deportation as a form of punishment, the challenge of fair
assessments regarding pretrial detention would remain.
III. ADDITIONAL STATE AND LOCAL INTERESTS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In addition to the significant constitutional problems immigration
detainers present, states and localities should also be concerned with
three important policy considerations: (1) the trust of immigrant
communities in law enforcement; (2) the effect of police officers’
implicit biases on their decisions to arrest; and (3) the significant
costs of immigration detainers. These important concerns, combined
with the potential for serious constitutional violations, illustrate that
state and local law enforcement can and should implement policies
that refuse to enforce immigration detainers.304
A. Additional State Interests
1.

Immigrant communities’ trust in law enforcement
State and local agencies should be concerned about the loss of
immigrant communities’ trust in law enforcement and its negative
effects on public safety. With the enforcement of immigration
detainers, individuals equate interactions with the police and the
criminal justice system with immigration enforcement because local
jails funnel noncitizens directly into ICE custody. When members of
an immigrant community perceive police officers as ICE agents, they
302. See McLeod, supra note 42, at 170 (“An immigration procedural rights
revolution may have the unintended consequence of legitimizing the increasingly
harsh substantive immigration law by offering, in principle, a panoply of robust
procedural protections seldom enjoyed by defendants in practice and against which
harsh substantive laws can be defended.”).
303. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748–49 (1987) (relying, ironically,
on the lack of an “absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings” to justify the pretrial
detention of criminal defendants based on a finding of potential dangerousness
under the Bail Reform Act).
304. For example, the District of Columbia has limited enforcement of
immigration detainers to only when the federal government reimburses the
District for costs of detaining individuals and decreased the period of time that an
individual will be held from forty-eight hours to twenty-four hours. D.C. CODE § 24211.07(a)–(b) (2013).
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begin to believe that any interaction with police, even to report a
crime, may result in deportation.305 Studies have shown that
immigrants are afraid they may be deported for relatively minor acts
like driving without a license; this concern that makes it difficult for
some of them to get to work.306 Such anxiety also leads noncitizens,
particularly those living in the United States without documentation,
to withdraw from the community and from public spaces.307 Both
advocates and the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) have
recognized this problem. HSAC suggested that ICE withhold
enforcement action of any kind against low-level offenders.308
Furthermore, overall community safety suffers when immigrant
communities perceive local police officers to be ICE agents.309 If
certain populations are afraid to interact with police officers, they are
less likely to report crimes or to provide law enforcement with
information related to crimes.310 For domestic violence survivors who
are already afraid to contact police to report their abuse, blurring the
line of local police and immigration enforcement only magnifies
their fears.311 They may be reluctant to call the police because of fear
305. See, e.g., METRO. KING CNTY. COUNCIL, SIGNATURE REPORT, No. 2013-0285.3, at
2 (2013) (finding that the threat of deportation was very strong in the local immigrant
community such that members of the community feared they would be separated
from their families if they reported crimes to law enforcement); see also George
Gascón, Feds’ Immigration-hold Policy Misguided, SF GATE (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:59 pm),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Feds-immigration-hold-policymisguided-4803416.php (highlighting the story of a domestic violence survivor who
was afraid to report her abuse to law enforcement and who was arrested but not charged
for immigration violations when she ultimately did contact police about the abuse).
306. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF GA., TERROR AND ISOLATION IN COBB: HOW
UNCHECKED POLICE POWER UNDER 287(G) HAS TORN FAMILIES APART AND THREATENED
PUBLIC SAFETY 10–14 (Azadeh Shahshahani ed., 2009), available at http://
www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1505/392 (documenting fears of
immigrant residents of Cobb County, Georgia about racial profiling by police
officers, especially during traffic stops); Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S.
Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88
N. C. L. REV. 1799, 1815 (2010) (explaining that immigrant communities have begun
to advertise for licensed drivers in response to the well-founded deportation concerns).
307. Hagan et al., supra note 306, at 1815–16.
308. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COMM., TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 21–22 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations- report.pdf
(describing the limits of ICE enforcement action in cases of minor traffic offenses).
309. See NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE
INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 6 (2013), available at https://greatcities.
uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Insecure_Communities_Report_FINAL.pdf
(reporting the results of a study of immigrants’ views of law enforcement and stating
that forty-five percent of Latinos reported that the increased police involvement in
immigration enforcement has made them less likely to voluntarily provide
information about a crime or to report a crime to police than they were before).
310. Id.
311. See Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico, An Up-Close Perspective: The Enforcement of
Federal Immigration Laws by State and Local Police, 7 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 321, 337–38
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that their abusers may be deported, an outcome that may harm
their family if they are financially dependent upon their abusers.312
Thus, one result of immigration detainer enforcement—the
perception that law enforcement equals ICE—negatively impacts
community cohesion and undermines immigrant communities’ trust
in law enforcement.
2.

Protection against police officers’ implicit biases
Because interactions with local law enforcement may lead to
immigration enforcement, local LEAs’ policies must curb police
officers’ implicit biases. Police officers have a great deal of discretion
in determining whom to arrest, and, therefore, discretion over whom
to screen to determine their immigration status.313 Reports illustrate
certain state and local agencies have clear biases against immigrant
communities, particularly Latino immigrant communities.314
Although some agencies may explicitly target Latino populations,315 it
is also likely that local agents are acting according to implicit biases
towards the Latino community.
Implicit bias is a growing field of psychological research that greatly
implicates various aspects of the law. The basic concept is that,
although individuals may not consciously express biases based on
race or other traits, they still may hold implicit, unconscious biases or
beliefs that affect their attitude and impact their behavior towards
certain groups.316 Legal scholars have examined the role of implicit
bias in many aspects of the law, including police officers’ behavior,317
(2008) (noting that abusers may use a domestic violence survivor’s immigration
status to discourage her from reporting the abuse to the police).
312. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., supra note 131, at 18.
313. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1285, 1347 (2012) (noting that discretion regarding arrest authority allows local
agents who favor greater immigration enforcement more opportunities to seek such
enforcement); Kalhan, supra note 114, at 1152 (asserting that recent changes in
immigration enforcement have transformed routine police activities into moments
that potentially lead to immigration policing and status determinations).
314. See GAO, BETTER CONTROLS, supra note 91, at 11 (explaining that some
jurisdictions with 287(g) agreements have implemented universal models that target
all types of offenders who may have immigration violations); see also Ozment, supra
note 97, at 126 (revealing that arrests of Latinos for driving without a license
increased from 23.6% before Nashville, Tennessee implemented a 287(g) program
to 49.4% after the city implemented the program).
315. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (D. Ariz. 2013) (detailing
constitutional violations committed by Maricopa County police officers against individuals
of Latino descent who the officers suspected were undocumented noncitizens),
adhered to by No. CV–07-02513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013).
316. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012).
317. See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035, 2053 (2011) (describing the concept in the context of some officers’
biases towards black individuals and explaining that, once the officers pay attention
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prosecutorial discretion,318 employment discrimination,319 and
landlords’ treatment of immigrant tenants.320 Implicit biases can
affect police officers’ behavior in three ways: it can make police
officers (1) more suspicious of some individuals based on their racial
appearance, (2) evaluate “ambiguous behavior” differently based on
racial appearance, and (3) treat different racial groups disparately.321
The analysis of implicit bias by police officers is especially relevant
in the context of immigration detainers because police officers have
discretion to arrest individuals under certain circumstances,
including for traffic stops.322 They also have discretion to determine
whether to honor an immigration detainer.323 Officers may assume
that a person is not authorized to be in the United States based on
the person’s ethnic identity or appearance.324 Applying the three
to such individuals, the officers may interpret behavior as violent or suspicious when they
would not interpret the same behavior by a white individual as violent or suspicious).
318. E.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on
the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806–22 (2012)
(arguing that racial bias permeates multiple phases of prosecutorial discretion—
from whether to charge a suspect, to whether to offer a charged defendant a plea
bargain, to selecting a jury for a defendant who goes to trial).
319. E.g., Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation, in
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 80, 80–94 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith
eds., 2012) (discussing evidence of continued discrimination based on implicit bias
in the workplace despite the federal prohibition on workplace discrimination).
320. E.g., Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, AntiIllegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 72–81
(2009) (noting that while there are “Anti-Illegal Immigration (AII)” ordinances
enacted to prevent housing discrimination, pre-conceived stereotypes lead to
“discrimination slippage,” a phenomenon where large number of individuals who
are not targets of AII ordinances are still victims of discrimination).
321. Richardson, supra note 317, at 2043–44.
322. See David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546 (1997)
(stating that police officers use traffic laws “to stop a hugely disproportionate number of
African American[] and Hispanic[]” drivers); Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1174–78 (2011) (documenting the history of
legal scholarship as it relates to police discretion since the 1950s).
323. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that the local
LEA was “free to disregard the ICE detainer”). When addressing concerns about
racial profiling in Secure Communities, one U.S. representative expressed confusion
that such a program enables officers to discriminate. See Hearing: Is Secure
Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure?, supra note 63, at 1–2 (statement of Rep.
Elton Gallegly, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration Policy & Enforcement)
(doubting a computer’s ability to racially profile). The representative’s comment
misses the point that it is police officers’ discretion, particularly for low-level offenses,
that leads to the arrest in the first place. This initial discretionary decision leads an
officer to book the individual, and the act of booking an individual leads law enforcement
to send the individual’s fingerprint information to Secure Communities—a step that
may eventually lead to removal proceedings and deportation.
324. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975) (permitting
one’s “Mexican appearance” to be a relevant factor in but not the sole justification
for a police officer’s decision to stop an individual); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The
Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH U. L.Q. 675, 677
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ways that implicit biases may affect behavior, a police officer may
immediately read someone as Latino and thus a noncitizen based on
the person’s appearance or language. The numerous cases brought
on behalf of U.S. citizens of Latino descent who have been
wrongfully detained under immigration detainers illustrate this very
phenomenon.325 Additionally, an officer may choose to interpret
certain pre-arrest behavior or facts, like lack of valid identification,
to mean that a person is undocumented, such as in Chel’s case
discussed earlier.326
With the growing convergence of immigration and criminal law,
police officers’ broad discretion not only impacts who gets captured
by the criminal justice system but also who ultimately gets funneled
into immigration enforcement. Data and stories from advocacy
organizations demonstrate that Latino individuals are especially
vulnerable to arrest for minor traffic violations, such as driving
without a license or driving with an expired license.327 While greater
awareness of implicit biases is important, one obvious way to
minimize their harmful effects is for LEAs to refuse to enforce
immigration detainers, thus severing the link between police officer
discretion and immigration enforcement.
3.

Costs of enforcing immigration detainers
One final but significant local interest is the cost of enforcing
immigration detainers. ICE does not incur any of the costs of
enforcing immigration detainers; rather, the entire cost falls upon
the state or local agency.328 Jurisdictions that continue to enforce all
immigration detainers report the enormous costs of doing so.329

(2000) (explaining that U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents of Latin
American descent “bear the brunt of race-based immigration enforcement”).
325. See, e.g., Galarza, 745 F.3d at 636, 638 (alleging constitutional violations after
the plaintiff, a Latino U.S. citizen, was wrongfully held in custody under an
immigration detainer for several days after he posted bail).
326. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
327. Hagan et al., supra note 306, at 1815.
328. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(e) (2014) (“No detainer issued . . . shall incur any fiscal
obligation on the part of [DHS], until actual assumption of custody by [DHS] . . . .”).
329. See, e.g., KATHY A. WHITE & LUCY DWIGHT, COLO. FISCAL INST., MISPLACED
PRIORITIES: SB90 & THE COSTS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1 (2012), available at
http://www.coloradofiscal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2013-3-1-v.2-SB90Misplaced-Priorities-Ed.pdf (stating that the annual cost of supporting immigration
enforcement in Colorado exceeds thirteen million dollars); Brandi Grissom,
Dewhurst Urges Obama to Pay Texas for Jailed Immigrants, TEX. WKLY.,
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/10/22/texas-jails-spend-millions-undocumentedimmigrants (last updated Oct. 22, 2013, 1:45 PM) (reporting that Texas county jails
spent more than $156.6 million to detain approximately 131,000 undocumented
immigrants in the span of two years).
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Jurisdictions that have passed ordinances refusing to enforce
immigration detainers have cited to the cost as a significant factor in
the law’s development.330
In addition to the costs of holding individuals under immigration
detainers, state and local LEAs also expose themselves to liability for
detaining individuals beyond the permitted period and for treating
individuals held under immigration detainers poorly. The case of
Ms. Villegas illustrates the financial cost of detainers. Ms. Villegas
was stopped by a police officer and arrested for driving without a
valid license; she was nine months pregnant at the time.331 A jail
employee, working as an ICE agent under the 287(g) program,
issued an immigration detainer for Ms. Villegas after inquiring about
her immigration status.332 She was classified as a medium-security
inmate and shackled during her labor and her recovery, actions
which later led Ms. Villegas to sue Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee.333 The Nashville and Davidson County council settled
with Ms. Villegas for $490,000.334
Local agencies have also been held liable for the prolonged
detention of individuals under immigration detainers. For example,
Mr. Quezada sued the Sheriff of Jefferson County, Colorado after the
county held him under an immigration detainer forty-seven days
beyond the county’s authority under the detainer.335 In the settlement,
the U.S. government and the county agreed to pay Mr. Quezada
$50,000 and $40,000, respectively.336 These costs are significant and
should only further motivate state and local legislatures to adopt
policies that refuse to enforce immigration detainers at all or, at least, to
enforce them in very limited circumstances.

330. See, e.g., COOK COUNTY, ILL., POLICY FOR RESPONDING TO ICE DETAINERS, 11-O73, at 1 (2011) (referencing the costs incurred by local agencies for immigration
detainer enforcement); Memorandum from R. A. Cuevas, Jr., Cnty. Att’y, to Rebeca
Sosa, Chairwoman, & Members, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs 2 (Dec. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.miamidade.gov/govaction/legistarfiles/Matters/Y2013/132196.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum from R. A. Cuevas, Jr.] (stating that Miami-Dade County,
Florida spent $1,002,700 in 2011 to comply with immigration detainers).
331. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t, 709 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2013).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Julia Preston, Settlement for a Shackled Pregnant Woman, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/us/settlement-for-a-shackled-pregnantwoman.html?_r=0.
335. Complaint & Jury Demand at 1, Quezada v. Mink, No. 1:10-00879-WJM-KLM
(D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2010).
336. Associated Press, ACLU Says Colo. Immigrant Settles Detention Case, FOX NEWS
(May 17, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/17/aclu-says-colo-immigrantsettles-detention-case.

AL-KHATIB.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

12/9/2014 2:44 PM

PUTTING A HOLD ON ICE

163

B. States Can and Should Pass Legislation To Limit Immigration
Detainer Enforcement
Given the compelling policy reasons for limiting detainer
enforcement, including the significant financial burdens placed on
state and local governments, state and local LEAs can, and should,
refuse to enforce them.337 One of the first jurisdictions that refused
to enforce immigration detainers altogether was Cook County,
Illinois.338 Cook County enacted an ordinance that provides that
“[t]he Sheriff of Cook County shall decline ICE detainer requests
unless there is a written agreement with the federal government by
which all costs incurred by Cook County in complying with the ICE
detainer shall be reimbursed.”339 The ordinance also prohibits ICE
agents from accessing county jails to conduct interviews.340 In
addition to concerns about the cost of enforcing detainers,341 other
reasons for implementing the ordinance included the concern for
increased racial profiling and the creation of distrust of law
enforcement among immigrant communities.342 The Cook County
ordinance has received criticism, including from ICE officials.343

337. The I-247 form that informs local law enforcement of the detainer states “[i]t
is requested” that local law enforcement perform one of the enumerated actions,
such as maintain custody of the individual for up to forty-eight hours. Department of
Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, supra note 121, at 1; see
also KATE M. MANUEL, supra note 179, at 12 (noting that interpreting detainers as
requests is consistent with the view that compliance with detainers is a matter of
comity between jurisdictions).
338. See generally COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE § 46-37 (2011).
339. Id. § 46-37(a).
340. Id. § 46-37(b) (providing exceptions for instances where ICE agents have a warrant
or the county has a law enforcement purpose unrelated to immigration law enforcement).
341. While cost is one stated concern, the Cook County Board President Toni
Preckwinkle has made clear that she is more concerned about preventing unjust
immigration enforcement practices. See Hal Dardick, Preckwinkle Ices ICE Proposal:
Rejects Call for Working Group to Resolve Issues, CHIC. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-10/news/ct-met-toni-preckwinkle-041120120411_1_preckwinkle-detainers-immigration-status (quoting Board President
Preckwinkle as saying “[e]qual justice before the law is more important to me than
the budgetary considerations”).
342. COOK COUNTY, ILL., POLICY FOR RESPONDING TO ICE DETAINERS, 11-O-73, at
1–2 (2011).
343. See Phil Rogers, Preckwinkle Blasted for Ignoring ICE Laws, NBC CHI.,
http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Preckwinkle-ICE-Laws-Cook-County137188118.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2012, 11:18 PM) (referring to a letter from
then-ICE Director John Morton to Cook County Board President Preckwinkle in
which Morton argued that Cook County’s decision to refuse to enforce immigration
detainers violated federal law and also was a dangerous practice because it led
criminals to be released back into the community).
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Other jurisdictions have passed laws that limit the enforcement of
immigration detainers to a narrow set of circumstances.344 In
California, various counties throughout the state have passed
legislation to limit the enforcement of immigration detainers.345
Then, in October 2013, Governor Jerry Brown of California approved
the California Trust Act.346 Unlike the Cook County ordinance, the
Trust Act permits the enforcement of immigration detainers in a
myriad of circumstances.347 The purpose of including this range of
offenses was to permit the state to enforce detainers against
noncitizens who were believed to be dangerous.348
Such state laws and local ordinances have received a great deal of
support from immigrants’ rights groups,349 but they have also
received a lot of opposition. Those who oppose limiting immigration
detainer enforcement argue that such refusal to enforce immigration
detainers is preempted.350 Under preemption analysis, there are

344. See sources cited supra notes 304–05 (concerning three local provisions); see
also Memorandum from R. A. Cuevas, Jr., supra note 330, at 3 (permitting
compliance with immigration detainer requests when the federal government agrees
to pay all related costs and when the individual subject to the detainer has been
convicted of a forcible felony, as defined by a Florida statute).
345. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12I (2013) (adopting a default policy that
no immigration detainer will be enforced unless the individual subject of the
detainer was convicted of a violent felony in the past seven years and a magistrate has
determined that there is probable cause to believe that the individual is guilty of a
violent felony); SANTA CLARA, CAL. BD. OF SUPERVISORS POLICY MANUAL § 3.54 (2014)
(explaining that Santa Clara County’s policy is to comply with detainer requests from
ICE on the condition that the federal government reimburse the county for costs
incurred in complying with ICE detainers); Paloma Esquivel, Santa Clara County to
Stop Honoring Immigration Detainers for Low-level Offenders, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011,
3:37 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/10/santa-clara-county-tostop-honoring-immigration-detainers-for-low-level-offenders-.html (noting Santa
Clara County had voted to only honor immigration detainers for detainees accused
of serious and violent felonies).
346. Act of Oct. 5, 2013, AB No. 4, 2013 Cal. Stat. 94 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 7282.5 (West 2014)).
347. The statute lists thirty-one crimes for which immigration detainers will be
enforced; they range from bribery and felony possession of a controlled substance, to
violent offenses like assault or kidnapping. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5(a)(3).
348. See Damian Dovarganes, California Governor Brown Vetoes Bill That Allowed
Towns to Release Undocumented Immigrants, NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012, 8:22 AM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/01/14170052-california-governorbrown-vetoes-bill-that-allowed-towns-to-release-undocumented-immigrants?lite
(stating that California Governor Brown vetoed an earlier version of the Trust Act
because it did not allow detainers to be enforced for other serious crimes).
349. Matt Stevens, Immigration Activists Cheer Trust Act at Hollywood Rally, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/05/local/la-me-ln-immigrantactivists-cheer-trust-act-at-hollywood-rally-20131005.
350. See Complaint in Chancery for Mandamus & Declaratory Relief at 1–2,
McCann v. Dart, No. 2013CH10583 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. Apr. 22, 2013) (filing a
lawsuit against the Cook County Sheriff for the county’s policy of refusing to enforce
any immigration detainer).
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three ways that state legislation could be preempted: express
preemption, conflict preemption, or field preemption.351 Express
preemption does not apply here because nothing in the federal statute
creating immigration detainers or the relevant regulation provides
that states cannot pass legislation refusing to comply with detainers.352
Regarding field preemption, there is no doubt that the federal
government occupies the field of immigration law.353 The Supreme
Court and the federal circuit courts of appeals have repeatedly
struck down state legislation that attempts to replace federal
immigrant enforcement measures.354 However, the Supreme Court
has upheld state statutes related to immigration enforcement—for
example a statute that penalizes employers who hire unauthorized
workers—if they do not conflict with or frustrate federal
schemes.355 Again, it is important to recognize that detainers are
merely requests, and the voluntary nature of the requests is part of
the federal scheme.356 Additionally, ICE has communicated that it
targets specific types of dangerous criminal offenders,357 which means

351. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2011); see supra note 211
(defining the three types of preemption).
352. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2014) (defining “detainer[s]” as “request[s]”).
353. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (“The Government of the United States has
broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”).
354. E.g., id. at 2510 (concluding that federal law preempted three of the four
provisions included in Arizona’s immigration law, S.B. 1070); United States v. South
Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529–32 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding two sections of a South
Carolina statute that criminalized certain activities for undocumented noncitizens
were preempted by federal law because no analogous federal criminal offense
existed). Consistent with this case law, at least one scholar has argued that federal
law preempts the enforcement of immigration detainers. See Lasch, Preempting
Immigration Detainer Enforcement, supra note 220, at 319–29 (applying recent Supreme
Court preemption analysis to conclude that the enforcement of immigration
detainers by LEAs should be preempted).
355. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509–10 (holding that section 2(B) of Arizona’s
law was not preempted because it could be implemented in a way that did not
conflict with federal law); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987
(2011) (holding that an Arizona law that allowed the state to penalize employers who
employ unauthorized immigrant workers by suspending or revoking their business
licenses was not preempted because it was consistent with federal policy related to
immigrants working without authorization).
356. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 641–42 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that
immigration detainers are requests and noting that federal immigration
enforcement has consistently treated detainers as voluntary requests, not mandatory
orders); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at *7 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (stating that the voluntary nature of
immigration detainers is consistent “with the general interpretation of the character
of INS detainers in other contexts,” such as for habeas corpus petitions).
357. December 2012 Morton Memo, supra note 6, at 2 (listing, among others,
individuals convicted of felonies and individuals with three or more misdemeanor
convictions as targets for immigration enforcement but excluding low-level
offenders from the list).

AL-KHATIB.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

166

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/2014 2:44 PM

[Vol. 64:109

that the current immigration enforcement scheme does not prioritize
capturing low-level offenders.
Furthermore, enforcement of immigration detainers must be
voluntary because mandatory enforcement would violate anticommandeering principles.358 Under Printz, the Supreme Court
struck down a federal program that required state and local law
enforcement to perform background checks on individuals who were
purchasing handguns.359 In declaring the statute unconstitutional,
the Court articulated two important concerns: (1) the states were
required to pay for the costs of the program, and (2) the state and
local officials were in a position to take the blame for any problems
associated with the program.360
Likewise, state and local law enforcement are entirely responsible
for the financial costs of immigration detainers.361 State and local law
enforcement also become the face of immigration enforcement when
detainers are involved, making them vulnerable to lawsuits362 and
undermining community policing efforts.363 In addition to these
articulated concerns, detainer enforcement clearly compels state and
local law enforcement to participate in a federal regulatory scheme.364
In City of New York, the Second Circuit found that a voluntary
information-sharing directive was not unconstitutional based on anticommandeering principles.365 However, here, when ICE issues a
detainer, it asks LEAs to do more than merely share information.366
On the DHS Form I-247, ICE may request that the LEA perform
several potential actions, the most burdensome being maintaining

358. Galarza, 745 F.3d at 643 (stating that the anti-commandeering jurisprudence
clearly dictates that immigration detainers should be deemed requests).
359. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 935 (1997).
360. Id. at 930.
361. 8. C.F.R. § 287.7(e) (2014); see also supra Part III.A.3 (detailing the significant
costs to state and local governments of enforcing immigration detainers and settling
lawsuits surrounding the unlawful detention of individuals under immigration detainers).
362. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief at 1, Brizuela v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. Feb. 13,
2012) (asserting that the petitioner’s detainer and continued detention under the
detainer was “unlawful” and violated his Fourth and Tenth Amendment rights).
363. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing how the conflation of immigration
enforcement and local police undermines trust in law enforcement, especially within
immigrant communities).
364. Cf. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289–90
(1980) (concluding that an environmental regulation statute related to coal mining
was not unconstitutional because it did not compel states to participate in a federal
regulatory program or to expend any state funds).
365. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
366. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (defining detainers as requests of state and local law
enforcement to maintain custody of individuals until ICE assumes custody).
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custody for a period not to exceed forty-eight hours.367 Thus,
mandatory enforcement of detainers would be unconstitutional.368
Because the federal government cannot compel localities to
enforce immigration detainers and enforcement of such detainers
presents serious constitutional and policy concerns, state and local
LEAs should implement policies restricting detainer enforcement.
The Cook County ordinance, which prohibits immigration detainer
enforcement under almost any circumstance, and the California
Trust Act, which permits immigration enforcement if the individual
subject to the detainer has committed any of the offenses
enumerated in the statute, illustrate the variation in legislation that
currently restricts immigration detainer enforcement in some
jurisdictions. Though a significant step in limiting immigration
detainer enforcement, the California law still allows detainers to be
enforced for thirty-one offenses.369 Cook County’s outright refusal to
enforce immigration detainers prevents any possibility of
constitutional violations and also advances important policy
considerations, like community trust in law enforcement. As more
and more jurisdictions continue to pass similar legislation and to
implement comparable policies, state and local LEAs demonstrate
their commitment to protecting constitutional rights and to restoring
immigrant communities’ trust in them.370
CONCLUSION
Enforcement of immigration detainers leads to serious
constitutional violations in many circumstances. ICE violates the
Fourth Amendment rights of those held under immigration detainers
when it issues detainers based on less than probable cause, and LEAs
subsequently violate the detained individuals’ Fourth Amendment
rights by enforcing detainers based on less than probable cause.
Following the initial issuance of the detainer, detention beyond the
forty-eight hour period violates the Fourth Amendment when a
neutral officer or judge has not made a probable cause
determination. Prolonged detention also violates the detained
367. Department of Homeland Security Immigration Detainer Form - Notice of Action, supra
note 121, at 1.
368. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that the
regulation concerning immigration detainers must read as authorizing only permissive
requests because, otherwise, it would violate anti-commandeering principles).
369. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
370. See Challenge Unjust Immigration Detainers, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CENTER,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/detainers#.UvZ8HLT-r6T (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
(listing all states and localities that have limited cooperation with immigration detainers).
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individuals’ due process rights because their liberty interest
outweighs the government’s interest in efficiently adjudicating
removal proceedings. In order to protect the liberty interest of
noncitizens held under immigration detainers, ICE should notify
local LEAs when it does not intend to assume custody of an individual
after the detainer has expired. For individuals who have pending
criminal cases and who have been issued immigration detainers, state
and local LEAs should respect the individualized determinations
regarding pretrial detention made in their criminal cases instead of
automatically enforcing the immigration detainers.
In addition to these constitutional violations that result from the
enforcement of immigration detainers, such practices create a fear of
local law enforcement within immigrant communities. Such a fear
may be justified, especially when police officers demonstrate
patterns of more aggressive policing against individuals they suspect
of being undocumented.
Not only do detainers threaten
community cohesion and public safety, but they also create
enormous costs for state and local governments because the financial
burden of enforcement falls on state and local agencies rather than
on the federal government. Consequently, state and local LEAs
should adopt policies that refuse to enforce immigration detainers.
If state and local LEAs decline to implement blanket policies, these
agencies should at least limit the enforcement of immigration
detainers to narrow circumstances, such as for detainers
accompanied by federal warrants or those issued against convicted
serious offenders, and train state and local officials so that they do
not target low-level offenders and so that they release individuals held
under an immigration detainer immediately after forty-eight hours.

